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Global taxes have been proposed in the past for many 
reasons including financing international development 
aid, reducing carbon emissions and, most recently, 
restraining financial speculation. This study reviews the 
more important global tax proposals that have been 
made in recent years. It concludes that while many 
such ideas seem inappropriate or inadequately thought 
through others are worth taking seriously. However, 
although good arguments can be made for taking a more 
global approach to taxation the reality is that no global 
governance structure that can impose such taxes exists 
or is likely to emerge in the near future. Global taxation 
– a dream for some and a nightmare for others – thus is, 
and is likely to remain for years to come, little more than 
a mirage.  
But mirages are sometimes useful because they may 
help motivate people to keep seeking better solutions to 
real problems. The world now faces such a problem in 
the fiscal area:  whether and how to reform the existing 
international tax regime. This study therefore also briefly 
reviews the evolution of this regime with particular 
attention to the question of whether the current 
‘soft governance’ approach to resolving the issues 
arising from the recent financial crisis issues is likely to 
produce politically acceptable, technically feasible, and 
economically efficient and effective results. If it does, then 
perhaps this approach may also, over time, be able to 
produce feasible and acceptable solutions to other global 
issues like those that underlie some of the proposals for 
global taxation discussed earlier. However, if current 
attempts to rethink and reshape the international tax 
regime in the end fall short, as past experience suggests 
is not unlikely, then perhaps, as with global taxes, the 
lesson to be drawn is not that we should give up but 
rather that we need to think much more about how and 
in what ways the increasingly interdependent world of 
the 21st century may perhaps be able to move a few 
steps further down the road of slowly and painfully 
adjusting its largely 19th century political structure 
based on sovereign nation-states to deal with the reality 
of supranational problems. Whether one begins by 
searching for the mirage for global taxation or answers to 
the real problems arising from the existing international 
tax regime, lasting solutions appear to require either a 
radical (and unlikely) change in how the world is run or, 
more probably but also much more tenuously, the kind 
of continual complex evolutionary process of inter-state 
negotiation and compromise that may, if we are lucky, 
eventually yield some kind of acceptable and perhaps 
adequate solution. 
Keywords: Global taxes, international taxation, taxes on 
finance, carbon taxes, international governance
JEL classification: F42, F53, F68, H23, H87, Q58
Summary
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International taxation – or its absence – has been much 
in the news recently.  The headline message that some 
large multinational corporations have dodged national 
attempts to tax corporate profits by exploiting holes and 
havens in the current system of international taxation 
has been heard.2 Many politicians in many countries have 
promised that something will be done to fix this problem. 
However, as yet it is far from clear what can or will be 
done.  One reason no quick or simple fix is possible is 
because there is really no international tax system.  What 
exists are separate and different national tax systems that 
incorporate features intended to deal with cross-border 
flows and are often, though not always, linked through a 
complex set of treaties.  There is no World Tax Authority, 
no World Tax Code, and no one in charge.  
The fairness, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
international tax system have long been cause for 
concern. Beginning with the League of Nations almost 
a century ago and more recently largely under the 
aegis of the OECD, many attempts have been made to 
rationalize and unify the bits and pieces that constitute 
the international tax system. The initial motivation 
behind such efforts was chiefly to alleviate the double 
taxation of cross-border income flows.  After decades of 
negotiation between countries and between taxpayers 
and the various national tax authorities, this goal was 
largely achieved in the decades after World War Two.  In 
the process of doing so, however, inadequate attention 
was perhaps paid to ensuring that international income 
was being fully taxed by anyone.  It is this problem – 
the under-taxation of international income flows owing 
to “base erosion and profit shifting” or BEPS, as the 
OECD (2013, 2013a) now calls it – that has now moved 
to the headlines and consequently to the top of the 
international fiscal agenda.3   
Certain aspects of these recent developments are 
discussed in the concluding sections of this study. 
However, the main subject of the study is not the current 
controversy about international taxation in the sense 
of the relation (or non-relation) between national tax 
systems but rather the earlier (and on-going) discussion of 
the possibility of truly “global” taxes. The principal focus 
here is thus on the question whether there can or should 
be truly global taxes and, if so, how such taxes might be 
structured, administered, and their proceeds distributed. 
International tax issues as such are considered only to the 
extent that the process through which such issues are or 
may be resolved may suggest some important lessons 
with respect to the future of global taxation.  
Many varieties of global taxation have been proposed 
over the years.4 Some such taxes are envisaged as 
worldwide, while others have a more regional focus. 
Some have broad bases and others narrow bases. Some 
could only be administered by a global (or regional) 
body but others could be administered at the country 
level (usually preferably in a coordinated manner). 
The proceeds of some taxes would be kept by those 
who collected them; for others the proceeds would be 
allocated by some redistributive formula. Some global 
taxes might take the form of surcharges on national 
taxes; others are envisaged as the possible basis of a 
new regional or even world tax system.  Some are linked 
to specific expenditure programs and their proceeds 
earmarked to particular purposes. The next section 
provides a brief overview of many of the global taxes that 
have been proposed and attempts to separate the wheat 
-- proposals worth more detailed attention -- from the 
chaff -- those that have been little discussed or do not 
seem worth pursuing further. 
Although few think that tax issues played a major role 
in the recent financial crisis,5 a common theme in the 
ensuing discussion has been that new (and possibly even 
global) taxes on the financial sector might both alleviate 
the fiscal problems currently afflicting many countries and 
reduce the likelihood of future financial crises. Several 
such taxes are therefore discussed at a little more length 
in the third section, followed by a section that discusses 
some of the ideas for global taxes on carbon emission that 
emerged in the earlier (and ongoing) debate about global 
warming.  A final substantive section then groups  several 
Introduction
2The discussion here focuses solely on the taxation of corporate income, which is the main subject currently under discussion in the international arena.  The 
somewhat less complex international problems that arise with respect to personal income taxes and taxes on transactions such as the value-added tax (VAT) are 
not considered.
3For the latest from the OECD on this issue, see http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps.htm
4Useful earlier reviews of global taxes from various perspectives include Steinberg, Yager and Brannon (1978) Cline (1979), Mendez (1992, 1997, 2001), Shome 
(1995), Frankman (1996), Paul and Wahlberg (2002), Wahlberg (2005), and Herman (2012).  Many (not all) of these reviews are by advocates of such taxes; for a 
notable exception see McMahon (2001). 
5Actually, certain features common to most national tax systems – notably, the treatment of interest deductions -- have arguably have made the financial world a 
bit more unstable than it would otherwise be (Alworth and Arachi 2012) although there has been surprisingly little emphasis on this point in the recent discussion.  
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other proposals for global taxes of various descriptions 
that have been floated at various times, often with the 
aim of expanding the resources available to foster the 
development of poorer countries.  Two broader issues – 
fiscal justice and earmarking – that come up at various 
points in the preceding review of substantive global tax 
proposals are then considered briefly to round off the 
discussion.     
As noted throughout the discussion of global taxation, 
one conclusion that emerges clearly is that even the 
most potentially virtuous global taxes are unlikely to be 
adopted in the absence of any truly global governance 
system. The final sections of the study therefore turn to 
this important question.6 In particular, some lessons that 
experience with reforming the international tax system -- 
the relation between national tax systems --- suggests are 
first discussed with particular attention to the question 
of whether the current ‘soft governance’ approach to 
resolving the issues arising from the recent financial 
crisis issues is likely to produce politically acceptable, 
technically feasible, and economically efficient and 
effective results. If it does, then perhaps this approach 
may also, over time, be able to produce feasible and 
acceptable solutions to other global issues like those 
that underlie some of the proposals for global taxation 
discussed earlier. 
In conclusion, the last two sections of the study argue 
that the immediate problem is not to develop an 
appropriately global fiscal solution to such big global 
problems as global warming, financial instability, and 
inequality.  Rather, it is to develop a more encompassing 
and effective institutional framework within which 
to develop and implement better and more feasible 
solutions to BEPS and other international tax problems. 
Once such a framework is in place, the world then may 
be able to deal more adequately with the basic issue 
that underlies most of the proposals for global taxation 
discussed here, namely, how best to provide adequate 
levels of such global public goods as the environmental 
commons (climate changes, etc.) and communicable 
diseases (HIV/AIDs, malaria, etc.) to cite only two of the 
items that a recent evaluation of the World Bank listed 
as shared global challenges facing that institution (IEG 
2008).7 However, if current attempts to rethink and 
reshape the international tax regime in the end fall short, 
as past experience suggests is not unlikely, then perhaps, 
as with the issue of global taxes, the lesson to be drawn 
is not that we should give up but rather that we need 
to think much more about how and in what ways the 
increasingly interdependent world of the 21st century 
may perhaps be able to move a few steps further down 
the road of slowly and painfully adjusting its largely 19th 
century political structure based on sovereign nation-
states to deal with the reality of supranational problems. 
In short, whether one begins by searching for the 
mirage of global taxation or simply for answers to the 
real problems arising from the existing international tax 
regime, any lasting solution appears to require either a 
radical (and unlikely)  change in how the world is run or, 
more probably but also much more tenuously, the kind 
of continual complex evolutionary process of inter-state 
negotiation and compromise that may, if we are lucky, 
eventually yield some kind of acceptable and perhaps 
adequate solution.
6The discussion of this issue draws heavily on an excellent recent review of governance with respect to international tax issues by Eccleston (2012). However, 
no attempt is made here to discuss, let alone resolve, the many complex substantive issues involved in reforming the international tax regime. For a very small 
sampling of the vast literature on issues in international taxation in recent decades, see e.g. Picciotto (1992), Avi-Yonah (2007), Cockfield (2010), Shaviro (2014) and 
the many works cited in these studies. 
7For interesting and useful discussions of these and such other candidates for global public good status as peace and equity, see the studies collected in Kaul, 
Grunberg and Stern (1999), Kaul et al. (2002), and Kaul and Conceicao (2006), as well as Kaul (2012), Sandler (1997,1998, 2002) and Barrett (2007).  While this 
vast subject is not further discussed here, it is perhaps worth mentioning that some writers on this issue appear at times to be pushing for particular solutions 
to problems that do not much resemble the theoretical concept of public goods. For example, international financial instability may be an undesirable feature 
often associated with increased international capital flows.  However, such instability is not simply a market failure that is a technical by-product of such flows but 
seems instead to result from particular market failures that are as yet not fully understood (Wyplosz 1999). Similarly, banning even therapeutic cloning and genetic 
enhancement may well be morally desirable from many perspectives, but it is not clear how such a ban can be characterized as a global public good (Barrett 2007) 
when such a good is defined as an outcome that makes “people everywhere better off (Barrett 2007, 1).”   
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Cleaning up the real world of international taxation is 
such a herculean task that it is perhaps not surprising 
that some have sought simpler, more direct, and more 
innovative ways to achieve such important global public 
goods as environmental sustainability, financial stability, 
and perhaps even peace and justice – two goals that are 
arguably interconnected to the extent that the failure to 
provide an adequate standard of life for many produces 
political unrest and even armed conflict.  An interesting 
example is provided by the array of levies recently 
suggested as possible sources of ‘innovative international 
financing’ in UN (2012):
• Royalties on natural resource extraction beyond 
100-mile exclusive economic zones
• Taxes on use of fossil fuels and other emission 
sources
• A “billionaire’s tax” of 1 percent of individual 
wealth holdings in excess of $1 billion
• An air passenger levy on airline tickets, with 
proceeds earmarked for UNITAID8 
• A currency transaction tax collected through a 
central clearing house
• A financial transaction tax
A fuller list of such global tax proposals may be found 
in Table 1. Over the years, many proposals have been 
made to impose assorted global taxes and levies to 
finance the activities of international agencies – often, 
unsurprisingly, by such agencies themselves. Frankman 
(1996) mentions, among others, the early benefits-
received approach adopted to finance  the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal 
Union (UPU), the early ability-to-pay approach suggested 
for financing  the League of Nations, and a variety of 
proposals put forward for various purposes by such well-
known economists as James Meade (progressive taxes 
based on average per capita income), Keynes (levies 
on balance of payments surpluses), Jan Tinbergen (a 
0.5 percent tax on selected consumer durables, as well 
as taxes on non-renewable resources, on international 
pollutants, a form of ‘brain drain’ tax, and a tax on 
activities of transnational companies), Mahbub ul Haq (a 
10 percent tax on international arms sales), and James 
Tobin (a currency transaction tax).9   
The Myth of Global Taxation
As Herman (2012) notes in a recent review of this 
literature, although many of the earlier proposals for 
various global taxes emphasized the importance of 
creating an automatic source for financing international 
development, this emphasis has not been nearly so 
prominent in most recent discussions. One reason is 
perhaps because experience has shown that countries 
are reluctant to cede even the most limited taxing 
authority to international organizations.  Of course, 
formal international organizations of various types have 
long existed at both the global and the regional level 
and such organizations need to be financed.  Several 
international organizations including the United Nations 
(UN) are currently financed by levies on their member 
countries.  However, as Barrett (2007, 128) correctly 
states, such “contributions can only be mandatory if 
states agree that they are mandatory. But under these 
circumstances, the amounts raised are determined 
endogenously” so that in effect “…all international 
financing is really voluntary.”  The simple fact is that no 
real global taxes have ever been imposed.  Indeed, such 
taxes seem most unlikely to be implemented in the near 
future -- except perhaps in the face of a major, immediate, 
highly visible and undeniable threat to planetary survival. 
Usually long and difficult negotiations between countries 
have been required to work out acceptable funding 
arrangements for international organizations.  Once such 
arrangements have been worked out they have generally 
proved to be sustainable -- indeed, almost unchangeable 
-- for long periods. To cite two long-standing examples, 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
established in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union 
(UPU) established in 1874 were both financed by banded 
membership assessments, initially with countries being 
grouped in seven categories, based roughly on their 
level of development, and all countries grouped in the 
same category paying the same share of the budget. 
Illustrating the strength of institutional inertia, to this 
day the contribution structure of both organizations still 
resembles that negotiated long ago although it has, as 
seems common, become considerably more complicated 
over time, with the UPU now having 11 contribution 
bands and the ITU 22. As in the beginning, however, 
member states may still essentially choose to be in any 
band they choose (except that the very lowest bands are 
limited to the least developed countries).
8UNITAID is an UN agency established under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO) to supply drugs to treat malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in 
developing countries.
9 The last of these ideas – the subject of an interesting book (Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 1996) -- is discussed further later in the present study.
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Table 1: A Catalog of Proposed Global Taxes
Taxes on the Financial Sector
• Taxes on international currency transactions (other names -- Tobin tax, currency transaction tax, or Robin Hood 
tax)
• Taxes on financial transactions, defined in various ways (other names -- speculation tax, global financial tax, 
financial tax, or financial instruments tax). Such a tax is scheduled to be introduced in some EU countries in 2014; 
some countries have imposed such taxes in various forms.
• Tax on bank balance sheets, adjusted for risk and perhaps other factors (other names --bank tax, bank levy, 
financial stability contribution, or financial crisis responsibility fee).  Numerous countries already impose such 
taxes (see Table 2).
• Tax on financial activities, as measured by some combination of bank profits and banker’s remuneration packages 
(other names -- financial institutions tax, bankers tax) 
Environmental Taxes
• Taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels (other names -- climate change levy, fuel tax; sometimes on narrower 
bases -- coal tax, car tax, or motor fuel tax). Some of these taxes are already levied in most countries (although 
many also subsidize such fuels in various ways).
• Taxes on international transportation (other names -- aviation, shipping, international passengers) have been 
proposed both as one way to tax carbon emissions and as a means to fund specific activities.  A ‘solidarity 
contribution’ in the form of small tax on air passenger tickets is now imposed in several countries (at different 
rates and bases) with the proceeds going to a special UNITAID, an  agency dealing with AIDs and certain other 
diseases.
• Taxes on international pollutants
Other Global Tax Proposals 
• Tax on international trade. Like taxes on transnational companies and taxes on international transfers of 
investment profit, trade taxes already exist in most countries but global taxes on these various activities have 
also been proposed, usually to finance aid to poorer countries.  
• Tax on countries receiving international migrants (‘brain drain’), with the proceeds going to countries of origin.
• Taxes on natural resources
- Royalties or fees on natural resource extraction (other name – global resources dividend)
- Taxes on economic rent from seabed mineral extraction (other name – global undersea resource royalty)
- Taxes on non-renewable resources more generally
- Taxes on international fisheries
• Taxes on very high incomes
• Tax on wealth (sometimes called billionaires’ tax).  
• Taxes on selected consumer durables (e.g. dishwashers, TVs)
• Taxes on international arms sales (sometimes called weapons tax or gun tax)
• Taxes on cigarettes (or tobacco).  Most countries already have such taxes but a special global tax has been 
proposed to finance international health programs. 
• Taxes on digital activities (other names – global internet tax, internet access tax, email tax, text or SMS tax, 
franchise tax)
• Taxes levied on countries to finance international aid and activities  
- Progressive taxes based on average per capita income
- Taxation on basis on estimated national revenue capacity
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The League of Nations established after World War I was 
financed on a somewhat clearer ability to pay basis, with 
country contributions being assessed on the basis of an 
index based on a combination of population (with the 
largest European member’s population as an upper limit) 
and government revenues. Interestingly, the United 
Nations which replaced and expanded the League after 
World War II still receives its ‘basic funding’ (which, 
however, now constitutes only 10 percent of total UN 
funding) from a very similar ‘ability’ related assessment 
based on Gross National Income (GNI) adjusted for per 
capita income and some other factors and with upper 
and lower limits. Most UN activities, however, including 
the most expensive, peacekeeping, are financed largely 
on a voluntary basis. All aspects of UN funding, like that 
of most international organizations, continue to be a 
matter of considerable political controversy and constant 
negotiation.10
At the regional level, similar essentially voluntary 
contributions have also been used to fund a variety of 
international bodies, agencies and organizations, but 
again, with one exception, none of these many and 
diverse funding structures can be characterized as a 
tax.11 The sole exception is the European Union (EU). 
Although the EU itself has no tax administration, it has 
since 1970 been largely funded by its own resources 
and is not dependent on voluntary contributions from 
member states. In addition to 75 percent of customs 
duties12 and a progressive personal income tax on its own 
employees, the EU has two additional sources of own-
revenues.  Initially, the most important source was a levy 
on a harmonized value-added tax (VAT) base (adjusted 
to be on a comparable base) in EU member states. Like 
customs duties, the EU share of national VAT collections 
is collected by national tax administrations and remitted 
to the EU.  The rate of this levy has over the years been 
reduced from the initially agreed 1 percent (raised 
to 1.4 percent in 1986) to the current level of only 0.3 
percent.  Most of the EU tax burden imposed on member 
states -- which is currently limited to a maximum of 
1.23 percent of GNP -- now takes the form of a residual 
assessment based (essentially) on the GNP of Member 
States. As EU (2008) describes in detail, the multi-annual 
financial framework is considerably more complex than 
this capsule description and includes a variety of special 
adjustments for particular countries. As always, who 
pays exactly how much for an international organization, 
whether regional like the EU or global like the UN, is a 
highly political issue that invariably requires complex 
negotiations between countries with differing interests 
and agendas.13  
The EU VAT levy takes the form of a proportional tax on 
a similarly-defined consumption base.  Moreover, it is 
collected by existing national tax administrations, subject 
to EU audit, and the proceeds of this levy are used to 
fund activities that in principle benefit the entire ‘tax 
community.’  Few of the key characteristics of this closest 
existing approximation to an accepted global tax – a ‘fiscal 
contract’ that imposes a flat rate tax on a harmonized 
consumption base to finance activities that clearly 
are considered to benefit those taxed (since they have 
agreed both to join the EU and to pay this tax), which is 
collected by existing national tax administrations (though 
subject to some form of global (EU) supervision) – have 
been prominent in the literature on global taxation. 
Much more attention has been paid to the remote 
but presumably highly desired (by the proponents of 
such proposals) possibility that a supranational taxing 
authority would be able to impose progressive taxes 
to fund activities that will, at least in the first instance, 
directly benefit others than those taxed.
In one of the earliest detailed examinations of global 
taxes, for example, Steinberg, Yager and Brannon 
(1978) considered a variety of such taxes that had been 
mentioned in the earlier literature -- on international 
trade and on international transfers of investment profits, 
for example, as well as economic rents from seabed 
mineral extraction.14 In addition, however, this study also 
suggested that development aid (at the level set by the 
then common target of 0.7 percent of GNP) could be 
financed by a shadow tax to be calculated by applying 
to each country a variation of the ‘representative tax 
10For some interesting (largely pro-UN) reading on this topic, see Mendez (1997) as well as other references cited in http://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance.html. 
See also the useful appraisal of UN financing in Barrett (2007).
11Payments made on a voluntary basis for which specific benefits such as those from belonging to a particular international organization are presumably obtained 
in return are not taxes as customarily defined (that is, compulsory unrequited payments to government).
12The other 25 percent is kept by the collecting country. The arrangements recently negotiated to finance the EU for 2014-2020 will reduce the share of the 
collecting country to 20 percent.
13After over two years of negotiation, a new financial framework for the EU covering the period from 2014-2020 was recently agreed.  Although the same (1.23 
percent) limit on EU taxation remains and almost no changes in the financing system were made, that the discussion continues is indicated by the fact that a 
special high-level group is to be appointed to investigate whether the system should be changed in the future (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
1004_en.htm).
14The last of these items, as well as taxes on international fisheries (Cooper 1977), is also discussed in Cline (1979).
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system’ (RTS) familiar from the intergovernmental grants 
literature.15 This calculation allocates the tax burden to 
countries that are richer in terms of their capacity (ability 
to pay) as measured by the estimated yield of a set of 
‘standard’ taxes if levied on the relevant tax base at the 
average rates applied by all countries. The RTS approach 
has two advantages compared to most proposals for 
global taxes: it leaves countries free to collect what 
taxes they want to collect and involves no international 
intrusion on national fiscal sovereignty.16 Many countries 
(e.g. Canada) have used variants of this approach in 
allocating equalization transfers to poorer regions. 
However, few such countries have thought that the 
national consensus underlying regional redistribution was 
strong enough to apply the same approach to calculating 
the extent to which such transfers should be financed by 
richer regions.   Since the politician who could extend this 
approach to the global level has not been born it is not 
surprising that, like all attempts to develop an acceptable 
automatic redistributive formula for global taxation, this 
proposal never advanced beyond the idea stage. 
Indeed, as Frankman (1996, 807) concluded some years 
ago that “at the global level, discussion of an organized 
system of redistribution has not yet made its way to the 
negotiating table in any meaningful sense.” The same 
is true today. Frankman (1996, 809) attributed this 
reality in part to “…the continuing stumbling block of 
sovereign agreement to grant revenue-raising authority 
to supranational bodies”  and went on to note that, 
since “a global economy requires structures of global 
governance”  one must first solve that small problem 
before being able to resolve the issue of “financing global 
order and development through international taxation” 
(Frankman, 1996, 815). The prognosis for extensively 
redistributive global tax schemes is thus bleak. This 
is not surprising since any sustainable supranational 
system must not only provide net benefits (gains from 
membership less costs of membership) for all member 
countries as a whole but also provide a net benefit for 
each and every member if it is to be rational for them to 
participate in what is, as Barrett (2007) emphasizes, an 
inherently voluntary system.17 Countries find it difficult 
enough to build and maintain a sustainable consensus 
on interjurisdictional distribution within their own 
boundaries. To do so across and between countries is 
inevitably a much more demanding task.  Nonetheless, 
as discussed further below, the fact that what some 
consider morally desirable is unlikely to be achieved in 
the near future does not imply that nothing can be done 
to improve matters with respect to either international 
taxation or the challenges of global public goods. As 
always, our inability to achieve perfection should not 
deter us from trying to do better. 
15Bahl (1972) had earlier used a similar approach in the international context in a pioneering paper on measuring tax effort across countries.  In fact, however, an 
alternative approach based on regression analysis (Bahl 1971) subsequently came to dominate this literature: for a recent analysis, see Fennochietto and Pessino 
(2013).  
16In another interesting early contribution, Dosser (1963) suggested that the burden of international aid should be allocated not on the basis of average per capita 
income but rather on the basis of increases in per capita income on the (perhaps overly optimistic) assumption that giving up a potential improvement in income 
rather than reducing existing income might make such a global tax approach more politically acceptable. 
17This is a brief summary of arguments developed at length in e.g. Sandler (1998) and Barrett (2007).
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One global public good (GPG) that has been much 
discussed recently is international financial stability. 
Whether or not this is a GPG,18 a number of corrective 
tax proposals were put forward during several recent 
international summit meetings concerned with this 
problem.19 The taxes that drew most attention in 
this discussion were three – the Financial Stability 
Contribution (FSC), the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) 
and the Financial Activities Tax (FAT).  This section takes 
a closer look at these three as well as an earlier and still 
live suggestion for a special type of FTT, the currency 
transaction tax (CTT).20  
An IMF (2010) report to the G-20 concluded that two 
of these taxes in particular – the FSC and the FAT--
warranted careful consideration. In a comment on this 
report, a former senior Fund official suggested that, while 
something like the FSC may indeed make sense as a way 
of reducing the existing implicit subsidy in many countries 
to excessive risk-taking by many financial institutions, the 
FAT – as is perhaps suggested by its acronym – seems to 
be more a reaction to populist politics than a sensible 
policy (Rogoff 2010). Not much has been heard about 
the FAT recently, but the FTT has been much discussed 
in both the financial and the popular media. As IMF 
(2010) stresses, cumulative taxes like the FTT which tax 
transactions between businesses are particularly difficult 
to analyze because of their complex and uncertain effects 
on business decisions.  Since such problems with turnover 
taxes are one of the main reasons for the (almost) world-
wide adoption of the VAT, it is not obvious why countries 
would want to replicate one of the main defects of 
such taxes by introducing an FTT. Indeed, one reason 
IMF (2010) preferred the FAT to the FTT was precisely 
because the former, unlike the latter, is analogous to the 
(more efficient) VAT.  In any case, in practice the financial 
Global Taxes on Finance
tax of choice for most countries so far appears to have 
been some variety of the relatively neglected FSC – the 
bank tax.  
Taxing Banks
Like most financial sector taxes, the FSC is an idea that 
has surfaced in different countries with many variants 
and under many different names including Bank Tax, 
Bank Levy, Financial Bailout Levy and Financial Crisis 
Responsibility Fee, all of which are henceforth referred to 
simply as bank taxes.  IMF (2010) suggests that the best 
bank tax is a flat tax imposed on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions, preferably with rates varying with 
the assessed riskiness of the portfolio.  Some of the many 
proposals made along these lines in both global forums 
and national discussions have suggested that the proceeds 
of any such tax should be earmarked to an insurance fund 
to bail the contributing institutions out in any future crisis 
rather than making taxpayers pay for bailouts.  As Table 
2 illustrates, taxes more or less like the FSC have proved 
to be a popular response to the financial crisis, especially 
in Europe.21 However, as Table 2 also makes clear, almost 
every country has imposed a somewhat different variant 
of the FSC, and there is little harmonization to be seen 
anywhere. Some of the countries included in Table 2, like 
others that have not imposed such bank taxes, have also 
sought similar results -- minus the revenue -- through 
various reforms in financial regulation and especially in 
capital requirements for financial institutions.22   
In contrast to the FSC approach, which essentially taxes 
some balance sheet characteristic, a Financial Activities 
Tax (FAT) is a tax imposed on some combination of bank 
profits and bankers’ remuneration packages.  Other labels 
that have been used for such levies include Financial 
Institutions Tax (FIT) and Bankers Tax. Rogoff (2010) 
18Although, as Wyplosz (1999) notes, from one perspective international financial instability may be considered a public bad (a negative externality imposed on 
all by the actions of some) that may, in principle, be corrected by a correctly designed and implemented fiscal offset (tax).  However, it is neither as clearly nor as 
readily understood to be a correctable externality as, say, the effect of carbon emissions on global warming.
19For useful overviews of some of the issues discussed at these meetings, which were widely covered in the financial press, see IMF (2010) and Munk (2013).
20There are, of course, many excellent discussions of financial taxes that raise important issues other than those discussed here: see, for an interesting example, 
Edgar (2013). 
21The effects of these levies are only beginning to be understood: see, for instance, a recent analysis of the German bank levy (Buch, Hilberg, and Tonzer 2014). For 
an example of how complicated some of these taxes may be, take a look at the 252 page official manual issued at the time of the introduction of the UK bank levy 
(available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget-updates/autumn-tax/bank-levy-manual.pdf).
22For the most part governments have chosen not to pursue regulatory ends through taxation, whether with respect to taxing finance or carbon (as discussed 
below).  From a purely fiscal perspective, this may seem sensible: use taxes to collect revenue and regulations to regulate behavior.  However, means and ends can 
seldom be so neatly divided.  Taxes may affect behavior in the same way as regulations and regulations may affect firms’ profits just as taxes (or subsidies) may do:  
see the seminal study by Posner (1971) on “taxation as regulation” as well as such more recent studies as Otsuka and Braun (2002) and Avi-Yonah (2011).  While it 
is not always clear why the regulatory approach seems to be preferred the burgeoning new literature on political economy and behavioral economics is beginning 
to close this important analytical gap (Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). As yet, however, no one seems to have made much progress in applying these 
emerging techniques to the world of international -- let alone global -- taxation, so little more is said here about such matters. 
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Table 2 
Special Bank Taxes in OECD Countries, 2013. 
 
 
Name of tax  Date 
imposed  
Maximum
Rate 2013  
Comments
Australia  Supervisory levy  1998 0.0044706%a A fee imposed by regulatory authority on the 
asset value of entities regulated 
Austria  Stability levy  2011 0.085%b On balance sheet of banks 
Belgium  Subscription (unit) 
tax 
1993 0.0965% On various bases for different classes of 
institutions (e.g. certain reserves of insurance 
companies) 
  Stability levy  2012 0.035% On liabilities less equity and guaranteed 
deposits 
  Annual tax on 
savings deposits 
2012 0.12%c On qualifying deposits less interest attributed 
in previous year times ratio of qualifying to 
attributed interest 
Finland  Bank tax  2013 0.125% On combined risk‐adjusted assets. To end in 
2015 
France   Bank levy  2011 0.5% On risk‐weighted bank assets for banks with 
capital requirement over EUR 500 million 
Germany  Bank levy  2011 0.06%d On liabilities with some exemptions
Greece  Bank levy  1975 0.6%e On value of loans made 
Hungary  Surtax  2010 0.053%f On adjusted balance sheet total 
Iceland  Bank levy  2011 0.04% On year‐end total liabilities 
Korea  Bank levy  2011 0.2%g On foreign currency borrowings 
Netherlands  Bank levy  2012 0.044%h On ‘unsecured’ debts (balance sheet equity 
and liabilities less certain adjustments)  
Portugal  Bank levy  2011 0.05%i On total liabilities.
Slovak 
Republic 
Bank levy  2012 0.4%j On liabilities.
Slovenia  Bank levy  2011 0.1% On balance sheet. To end in 2015. 
Sweden  Stability fee  2009  0.036% On liabilities
United 
Kingdom 
Bank levy  2011 0.13% On global balance (with some exclusions)
Notes: (a) 0.00414% is the cost‐recovery rate on authorized deposit taking institutions, subject to a maximum of AUD2.1 
million. In addition, a rate of 0.000566% is applied to all assets of such institutions. Certain other financial institutions are 
subject to different rates. (b) Rate on EUR 1‐20 billion is 0.055%. An additional levy of .013% is imposed on the trading volume 
of derivatives. (c) Rate varies from 0.03‐0.12% depending on ratio of loans granted to ‘real economy’ as opposed to other 
financial institutions. (d) Progressive rates with maximum shown applying to base over EUR300 billion; additional tax of 
0.0003% on derivatives held (on or off balance sheet). Maximum is lesser of 20% of (adjusted) annual profits or 50% of 
(adjusted) annual profits of most recent 3 years, subject to further limitation that must pay at least 5% of calculated annual 
contribution. (e) Rate on mortgage loans is only 0.12%. (f) 0.15% up to HUF 50 billion; banks can reduce liability by certain 
factors.  Rates differ for other financial institutions. (g) This is rate on liabilities with maturities of 1 year or less; rate for longer 
maturities is lower. (h) This is rate on short term debt; 0.22% on long‐term debt Progressive rate by amount of levies in 
preceding year. (i) Also a rate of 0.00015% on derivatives (with some exemptions). (j) Rate varies with amount of levies in 
previous year and share of total assets of banking sector. 
Source:  Based on information in OECD (2013b). 
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suggests that there is no rationale for such a tax if the 
basic regulatory system is adjusted properly – which in 
practice might mean imposing something like an FSC.  On 
the other hand, IMF (2010) noted that if inappropriate 
regulatory policy created substantial rents (unearned 
incomes) in the financial sector and a country decided 
to subject such rents to special taxation, a FAT could not 
only generate increased revenues efficiently but also 
provide a uniquely efficient way to achieve the equitable 
end of taxing overly generous reward structures.23    
An appropriate FAT to achieve these ends might, for 
example, be one that taxed profits on a cash flow basis 
through any of the approaches often discussed with 
respect to the reform of profits taxation – by allowing 
both interest expense and a notional return on equity, 
taxing only net distributions to shareholders, or defining 
taxable receipts and expenditures to include principal 
amounts (IMF 2010, Appendix 3). Somewhat similarly, 
Vella (2012) argued that there was a stronger case for a 
FAT than for an FTT on both equity and efficiency grounds. 
In practice, however, although both the UK and France 
introduced temporary bonus taxes at the time of the 
crisis, countries have generally been hesitant to single out 
employees in the financial sector in this way. Perhaps for 
this reason the EU in 2013 followed the apparently more 
politically palatable approach of adopting a regulation 
that will, beginning in 2014, limit bonuses paid to high-
paid bankers to the amount of their salary or double 
that amount if approved by shareholders (PwC 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, by far the strongest opposition 
to this approach came from the UK.24  
Taxing Financial Transactions
Despite the popularity of bank taxes like those shown 
in Table 2, in many ways the current favorite flavor of 
financial taxation in public discussion is some form of 
Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) -- a tax imposed not on 
financial institutions as such but on specific types of 
transactions. Such taxes may be levied on the sale of 
specific financial assets, such as stock, bonds or futures 
whether through organized exchanges or over-the-
counter (OTC); they may be applied to currency exchange 
transactions; or they may be general taxes imposed on 
a variety of different transactions. Brondolo (2011) lists 
23 different types of financial transactions that may 
be subject to such taxes and, as Table 3 shows, many 
of these possible tax bases seem to have been used to 
varying extents by different countries. Other names for 
similar taxes include Speculation Tax, Global Financial 
Tax, Financial Tax, and Financial Instruments Tax. 
The attraction of an FTT is obvious: not only are people 
everywhere still smarting about the behavior of the 
financial sector during the recent crisis but such taxes 
have a potentially huge base and hence yield.  However, 
despite continuing concern about the dangers of 
speculative bubbles, only a few countries have imposed 
specific taxes on certain types of financial transactions 
with the avowed aim of controlling short term speculative 
actions. No global or regional FTT yet exists – although, 
as discussed below, the EU (or at least part of it) is 
scheduled to introduce such a tax in the near future.  
As Table 3 shows, many countries have imposed a variety 
of taxes on various categories of financial transactions in 
part to help regulate and control the financial sector and 
in part simply for revenue. Like the bank taxes listed in 
Table 2, most of the taxes on financial transactions listed 
in Table 3 are imposed on bases that are not uniform from 
country and that over time have often – like the rates – 
been changed, usually in response to countervailing forces 
that Coelho (2009, 2) categorizes as “…the strong appeal 
of…a good tax handle in times in public finance distress” 
on one hand and, on the other hand, “…the controversial 
nature of the tax, which finds hard to hold when the 
strong need for additional tax revenue subsides.” Indeed, 
some countries have a history of imposing, altering, 
abolishing, and re-imposing such taxes.  In addition to 
the countries included in Table 3, for example, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Singapore, Sweden, and probably others have 
had some variety of FTT in the past – some on securities, 
some on bank debits or transactions, some on currency 
transactions and some on automated payment systems. 
Some of these taxes, notably the UK stamp duty (and the 
similar taxes in a number of countries heavily influenced 
by British experience), are very old; others, notably 
the post-crisis levies recently imposed in a number of 
European countries (European Commission 2010; Credit 
Suisse 2013) are very new.  The simple attraction of a 
large, expanding, and easily accessible tax base has even 
led some recent authors to suggest that countries would 
be well-advised to replace all or most of their existing tax 
systems by such a tax.25 As Coelho (2009) notes, however, 
23The perceived need for either or both an FSC (for efficiency) and a FAT (for equity) would presumably be reduced by closer control of “unacceptably aggressive 
tax planning” as proposed in IMF (2010, 10) and discussed at length in OECD (2013, 2013a) as well as by the reduction or removal of the strong tax bias favoring 
debt financing suggested in Alworth and Arachi (2012), but such matters are beyond the scope of the present study.  
24The reasons for this opposition are discussed in detail in Seely (2013)’s interesting account of the lengthy UK discussion of both the bonus tax and the bank levy 
(see Table 2).
25For such a proposal, see Cintra (2009). A very similar proposal has recently been put forward in India, in part as a way to reduce corruption: see ArthaKraniti 
(2013).  
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Table 3 
Financial Transaction Taxes* 
Country  Year 
Imposed 
 
Rate 
(Max)  
Base  Comments 
European 
Union 
2104  0.1%  Equities and bonds  0.1% on derivatives 
Argentina  2001  0.6%  All financial transactions   
Australia    0.3%    0.15% on corporate bonds 
Austria    0.15%     
Belgium    0.5%   Certain financial instruments  Rates from 0.07%;  capped (max 750 Euro) 
 
Brazil  2011  1%  Tax on financial operations  Tax on foreign exchange derivatives abolished in 
2013; short‐term overseas loans and credit card 
transactions still taxed 
Chile  1974    Financial transactions  Imposes 18% VAT on trade costs 
China      Exchange‐trade instruments  Listed securities can only be traded on exchange 
Colombia  2000  1.5%  Stocks, bonds   
China    0.8%  Securities  Rates differ in different stock markets 
Cyprus    0.15%  Transfers on stock exchange   
Finland   1997  1.6%    Transfers not made on stock exchange 
France  2012  0.2%  Equities and similar   
Greece  1998  0.6%  Stocks, bonds   
Guatemala    3%  Stocks, bonds   
Hungary  2014  0.1%  Equities, bonds, etc  0.01% on derivatives 
India  2004  0.125%  Stock exchange   
Indonesia    0.14%  Stocks, bonds  0.03% on bonds; 10% VAT on commissions 
Ireland    1%  Transfers on stocks  Stamp duty with rates varying up to 9% on transfers 
for non‐real property 
Italy   2013  0.2%  Equities; OTC transactions  0.1% on equities 
Korea      Stock exchange   
Malta    2%  Transfers not on local stock 
exchange 
Stamp duty 
Netherlands     6%  Purchase of large amount of 
shares in real estate 
company 
 
Pakistan    0.15%   Stocks, corporate bonds   
Peru  1989  0.08%  Stocks, bonds  Plus 185 VAT on trade costs 
Poland     1%  Securities   
Portugal  2013  0.3%  Equities; bonds, other  0.3% on derivatives; 0.1% on high‐frequency trading 
Russia    0.8%   Secondary offerings  Plus 20% VAT 
South Korea    0.35  Stocks, corporate bonds   
Spain  2014    Equities and similar   
Switzerland    0.3%  Stamp transfer tax  0.15% on Swiss securities 
Taiwan    0.3%  Share transactions  0.1% on corporate bonds 
Ukraine  2013  1.5%  OTC transactions   Rates vary up for 0.1% on OTC tran 
United 
Kingdom 
  0.5%  Securities transfers  Stamp duty 
United States      SEC fee   
Venezuela    0.5%  Stocks   
Zimbabwe    0.45%  Stocks  VAT on trade costs 
*Information in this table has been compiled from diverse sources that are not always in agreement and refer to different time 
periods. VAT often applies to commissions and trade costs even when this is not specifically noted and may similarly apply to 
such costs in countries not listed here. Moreover, countries often change the rates and coverage of these taxes. In short, the 
table should be seen as only illustrative of the level and kinds of national FTT found in the world.  
Sources: Credit Suisse (2013); European Commission (2010); Brondolo (2011); Beitler (2010); Coelho (2009) 
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even in Brazil, where his analysis suggests the tax at one 
time perhaps the most productive in Latin America, it 
never yielded much more than 1.5 percent of GDP.26
Although much of the initial discussion of a financial 
transactions tax envisaged a global (world-wide) levy, 
the only real action beyond the country level has taken 
place at the regional level in the European Union 
(EU). The European Commission formally proposed 
a plan to implement an EU-wide FTT in 2011 with the 
principal objectives of ensuring that the financial sector 
contributed in a “fair and substantial” way to covering 
the costs of the crisis, discouraging financial institutions 
from undertaking excessively risky (speculative) activities 
and, of course, raising revenue. However, the unanimity 
required to implement such a proposal at the EU level 
could not be achieved in view of the opposition of such 
countries as the United Kingdom and Sweden – both of 
which, interestingly, had had experience with somewhat 
similar taxes.27 In early 2012 the Commission proposed 
that two-thirds of the revenue from the tax would go to 
the EU budget, with the balance to the Member States. 
Later that year, however, in reaction to resistance to its 
earlier proposal the Commission suggested a so-called 
‘enhanced cooperation procedure” that would allow 
a minimum of nine EU members to go ahead with the 
FTT without other member states being involved. After 
11 (out of 27) member states decided to proceed, in 
February 2013 the European Commission adopted a 
proposal for an 11-nation FTT that would come into force 
in 2014 if approved by all the participating member states 
and the European Parliament (Siebert 2013).28 At the 
time of writing, however, it appears that the eleven had 
not yet been able to reach full agreement on such basic 
matters as the scope of the tax and, not least, on how to 
distribute the revenue, with some countries being very 
reluctant to see any of the revenues flowing to Brussels. 
As a result, it now appears that the EU FTT is likely to be 
imposed much before 2015 (Fairless 2013).
The EU FTT proposal is for a small tax on the sale or 
purchase of a wide range of financial instruments 
when one of the parties to the transaction is a financial 
institution and one (whether a financial institution or 
not) is established in a participating Member State. The 
purchase and sale of shares and bonds is to be taxed at a 
minimum rate 0.1 percent and the exchange of derivatives 
is to be taxed at 0.01 percent.  These rates may seem low 
but if a transaction from one investor to another goes 
through a broker, a clearing house and another broker 
ii would be taxed six times. Although over-the-counter 
(OTC) trading is also taxable, it is obviously much more 
difficult to enforce the tax on such transactions (Brondolo 
2011) so some, perhaps considerable, divergence away 
from organized exchanges to OTC trading may occur. 
Even more questionable is the fact that the FTT is 
supposed to be applied even to transactions outside of 
the participating EU member states when one party is 
taxable under the proposal as well as when the financial 
instruments traded are issued in participating Member 
States, although it is unclear how this provision could 
be enforced in many cases. Its scope is bounded by the 
exclusion from the FTT of transactions where there is no 
link between the economic substance of the transaction 
and the territory of a Member State.  However, it is 
expanded by the fact that the definition of a financial 
institution may include certain non-financial institutions 
and also non-EU financial institutions with branches in 
Member States. On the other hand, the scope of the tax 
is reduced by excluding several important categories such 
as transactions on the primary market, spot currency 
transactions, and the issuance of government bonds. 
Although the original EU FTT proposal (as quoted by Vella 
2012, 90) stated that “private households and SMEs not 
actively investing in financial markets would hardly be 
affected,” the implication that the incidence of the tax 
will fall solely and completely on the parties who pay over 
the tax to the government is unfounded.  As IMF (2010) 
correctly notes, it is naïve to assume that the tax will be 
borne entirely by rich banks and bankers.  Like all taxes on 
transactions, much of the burden will probably be passed 
on to users of financial services, both individuals and 
businesses, and any businesses affected will in turn pass 
26European Commission (2010) provides a similarly restrained view of the likely revenue potential of an FTT as well as a useful review of the literature on the 
incidence and effects of such taxes.
27The UK tax is generally considered to work reasonably well. It takes the form of a small (0.5 percent) levy paid by purchasers of UK shares and assessed and 
collected primarily through an electronic securities settlement system. However, registered market makers and large banks are exempted from this tax. In contrast, 
a similar small tax imposed by Sweden in 1986 is usually considered to be a failure.  Although initially the rate on share transactions was doubled and the base 
was soon expanded to include all transactions in shares as well as bonds, the effect on trading volumes was dramatic:  most bond trading  soon vanished and 
most (60 percent) of trading in Swedish shares moved abroad.  All financial transactions taxes were abolished by Sweden in 1991. However, Sweden introduced a 
new ‘stability fee’ at a rate of 0.036% on the liabilities of banks and other credit institutions in 2009.  This levy is similar to the Bank levy imposed on bank balance 
sheets in 2011 by the UK at a rate of 0.05% but as of 2013 levied at a rate of 0.13%: the rate was increased a number of times, largely to ensure that despite 
reductions in the corporate tax rate, the taxes paid by banks would not be decreased (Seely 2013). 
28The 11 countries – all in the Eurozone – that have indicated they will sign on are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, and Spain.  Several other members of the Eurozone (e.g. Finland and Ireland) have at times indicated they too might sign on, but none of the 
nine non-Euro EU countries seems to have publicly shown much interest in doing so.
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on their share also to consumers if they can.  Moreover, 
although the Commission justified the FTT both on the 
grounds of fairness and the strengthening of the internal 
market, it may well end up weakening that market in at 
least some respects. As Siebert (2013) suggests, it is not 
perhaps far-fetched to think that this proposal may have 
been motivated as much or more by populist desires 
to visit retribution on bankers in return for the pain 
imposed by the financial crisis than by evidence-based 
analysis that supported this particular way to adjust the 
institutional structure of financial sector activity in the 
EU.  
In any case, the expected objections to such taxes 
have been heard from the financial sector itself.   As an 
example, the Institute of International Finance (2013) 
presents five arguments against the EU FTT.  Three such 
arguments apply to all such taxes, while the last two 
relate to the limited geographic coverage of the EU FTT:   
1. It will hurt savers and pensioners among others 
because its ultimate burden will be borne by 
end-users of financial services
2. It will reduce market liquidity resulting in higher 
volatility, higher transactions costs, and a higher 
cost of capital 
3. It will be ineffective because over time the 
system will work around it.
4. It will place affected institutions at a competitive 
disadvantage and lead to loss of jobs in the 
participating Member States 
5. It will create serious extraterritorial concerns for 
non-EU investors and reduce capital flows.
All of these arguments have been countered with varying 
degrees of effectiveness by European Commission (2010) 
as well as by many others such as Schulmeister (2012) 
and Schaefer (2012).  To take the first point, although it 
was noted above that it was naïve to assume that the FTT 
would stick where it hit, it is equally naïve to assume, as 
such opponents of the tax as the Institute of International 
Finance (2013) seem to do, that all or even most costs 
will necessarily be passed through to end-users – let 
alone to such politically resonant categories as savers 
and pensioners.  Does anyone really believe that there no 
‘rents’ in the financial industry, as such statements seem 
to assume?  All that can really be said with certainty is 
that no one knows how any FTT will be shared between 
the owners and employees of financial institutions, their 
immediate customers and others.  
Similarly, arguments can easily be made – and supported 
or refuted by selective recourse to the unsatisfactory 
and uncertain evidence -- for and against the other 
points in the above list.  For example, while the second 
claim is supported by some studies (e.g. Oliver Wyman 
2012) it is countered by others, including the European 
Commission’s own Impact Assessment accompanying 
the original FTT proposal which noted, correctly, “…that 
the effects of the FTT on volatility is largely inconclusive 
and depends on market structure” (as quoted by Vella 
2012, 94).  Moreover, there is really not much to support 
either side when it comes to deciding whether a financial 
market with FTT will be less prone to crisis than one 
without FTT.  All in all, without going further into the 
many complex details of what is a growing but still far 
from definitive body of analysis, as Vella (2012, 90) 
concludes, all too often both proponents and opponents 
of the EU FTT seem to be making assertions “…with an 
assuredness and lack of qualification that, at best, masks 
the uncertainty which underlies them.”29
Finally, while, as mentioned earlier, not all details of 
how the EU FTT will work are fully clear, and no doubt 
many problems will be encountered in attempting 
to implement this levy in a number of very different 
countries, the extensive experience that these and other 
countries have had with related taxes (Table 3) suggests 
that to say that it will be ineffective and will result in 
lost jobs and reduced capital flows overstates the case. 
On the contrary, as both IMF (2010) and Brondolo 
(2011) conclude, the existence of similar taxes in many 
countries and the similarity of the international aspects 
of the administrative problems involved to the problems 
that already exist with other taxes suggest that, although 
an FTT is indeed unlikely to work perfectly and may well 
– like most taxes – give rise to some distortions, it can 
in all likelihood be made to work satisfactorily without 
bringing ruin to those countries that choose to impose it.
Tobin Tax
Although the FTT has sometimes been called a Tobin 
Tax this term is more accurately used for a tax limited 
only to international currency transactions (also 
sometimes called a Currency Transaction Tax (CTT) or, 
more colorfully, the Robin Hood Tax).  Interestingly, while 
this idea has been around for a long time, having been 
initially proposed by a Nobel prize-winning economist 
(Tobin 1974, 1978), major institutions and countries 
29There is of course a large literature on the FTT which is not reviewed here, ranging from such early overviews as Spahn (1995) and Shome and Stotsky (1995) to 
more recent policy-oriented papers such as TUAC (2010) and Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) and more analytical papers like Bierbrauer (2012) and Fricke and 
Lux (2013).
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have not so far demonstrated much interest in moving 
in this direction.  Somewhat provocatively, one reason 
for this reluctance may be simply because the CTT has 
been examined more carefully than most other global 
taxes on finance that have been proposed recently.  In 
summing up a useful volume of diverse papers on the 
Tobin tax, Eichengreen (1996, 285) concluded that, 
before adopting such a tax, more definitive answers were 
needed to “…questions about the operation of foreign 
exchange markets: the scope for asset substitution, the 
feasibility of market migration and the possibility that 
foreign exchange transactions might be reorganized on 
an over-the counter basis” as well as to “…questions 
about the political economy of taxation: about the 
economic as opposed to the statutory incidence of the 
Tobin tax and about the political coalitions that are likely 
to form in favour and in opposition.”  As suggested above 
with respect to the EU FTT, although considerable useful 
research has been carried out on some of these matters 
since this passage was written, our understanding of 
both the economics and the political economy of such 
proposals has not yet reached the point where such 
taxes are likely to be easily accepted regionally, let alone 
globally.   
Nonetheless, taxes on international currency flows have 
been long been taken seriously by economists and have 
been the subject of considerable analytical work.  Tobin’s 
original proposal was aimed at reducing volatility in the 
foreign exchange markets – an issue about which there 
is still considerable discussion. As Rajan (2003) notes, for 
example, a good case can be made for a small tax on such 
transactions as part of the set of safeguards – prudential 
regulations, liquidity enhancing measures, and restraints 
on financial flows (including the Tobin tax) – intended to 
prevent rather than resolve financial crises.  Owing to 
its likely effects on market expectations, the immediate 
result of imposing such a tax once a crisis has occurred, 
however, may perhaps exacerbate rather than improve 
matters.30
Rajan (2003), like many who have written about the 
Tobin tax, emphasized the desirability of imposing it 
permanently on a global basis and using the revenue 
redistributively as a supplement to aid.31 However, 
his analysis did not presume either of these features 
since in effect it considers the Tobin tax to be like any 
other Pigouvian tax intended to correct undesirable 
externalities.  From this perspective, the government in 
any country large enough for the expected benefits from 
reducing the negative externality to offset any jobs lost in 
the affected sector cannot lose from imposing such taxes 
if they are properly designed and applied.  If the tax base 
is highly elastic, the undesired activity will be deterred to 
some extent, which is, by definition, a desirable result. 
If the tax base is less elastic, the deterrent effect of the 
tax will be less but in compensation, it will generate 
more revenue from a less distorting tax system, which 
no government should really view as an undesirable 
result.  If a national Tobin tax were indeed such a win-win 
levy, it is surprising that the United States and perhaps 
the Eurozone countries have not already jumped on this 
bandwagon. 
In fact, as Stubbs (2012) discusses in detail, no country 
has done do, although Brazil and Chile have arguably 
at times come close.32 As Coelho (2009) notes, the few 
national examples of the Tobin tax have generally been 
established in response to a specific national economic 
crisis and then removed when the crisis was past.  The 
electronic basis of the clearing and settlement system 
currently operating in most countries with large currency 
transfers suggests that the administration of such taxes 
should be relatively simple (Taskforce 2010).  However, 
there seems to be no realistic prospect for global 
currency transaction taxes (Stubbs 2012).The reason is 
simple: there is insufficient agreement on the need for 
such taxes, on the appropriate basis for such taxes, on 
the structure of such taxes, on the use to made of any 
revenues such taxes may generate or, most importantly, 
on who would decide on all these matters and how. 
Before the day of global taxation can begin to dawn these 
fundamental problems need to be overcome.33
Consider, for example, the unusually well worked-out 
proposal in Taskforce (2010) for a global tax on international 
currency transactions.  This report suggests that this CTT 
– labelled, presumably for reasons of marketing, the 
Global Solidarity Levy – should be administered by “…
an authority with formal oversight powers for licensed 
international settlement infrastructure and executive 
oversight of the proposed settlement institution’s tax 
30For a recent result suggesting that, on the contrary, the Tobin tax is effective in reducing exchange rate volatility even in turbulent periods, see Damette (2013), 
which also provides a useful review of the conflicting theoretical and empirical literature on the effectiveness of this tax. 
31Essentially the same position was taken more recently by ECLAC (2011), with respect to both the FTT and the Tobin tax. 
32The (recently largely abolished) Brazilian tax – the IOF -- is described in Coutinho (2012); for an analysis of the earlier Chilean experience, see Agosin and Ffrench-
Davis (1996). 
33Even if countries were convinced that they could impose such a tax with few undesirable consequences, it would of course require a very different political 
decision for them to agree to devote any revenues thus gained to international development.
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raising functions in conformity with the legislation 
in the jurisdiction of residence or operation of the 
settlement institution (Taskforce, 2010, 28).”34 It then 
goes on to propose (1)  that the arrangements to create 
such an authority should be worked out by an inter-
governmental tax commission, to be chaired by the IMF 
and convened by such worthies as the finance ministers 
and central banks of the G20 and the countries that host 
the larger international financial centres, the Board of 
Directors of the Bank of International Settlements, and 
representatives of the World Customs Organisation 
Council, and (2) that the proceeds of the CTT to be imposed 
on all international currency settlements should flow to 
a Global Solidarity Fund which will disburse the funds 
collected as determined by “…its own decision-making 
board comprising a range of stakeholders including 
civil society and business sector [from developed and 
developing countries] together with the Consultative 
Forum [which would include NGOs and other stakeholders 
not on the board]” (Taskforce, 2010, 31).  Unfortunately, 
since no one has yet come up with any acceptable way 
to establish any such global administrative entity - let 
alone the World Tax Organization proposed by Tanzi 
(1995)35 -- establishing an automatic way of channelling 
increased resources to fund development seems still to 
be a bridge too far down the road to global government 
to be attainable in the near future. 
As Morozov (2013) notes, those who oppose social 
change invariably adopt one of three themes:36 
• Perversity – the proposed change will not 
improve matters but worsen them
• Futility – the proposed change will have no 
effects in the long run
• Jeopardy – the proposed change will threaten 
some existing hard-won achievement.
Many of the arguments made in opposition to the FTT 
can be categorized in these terms.  Some have argued 
that rather than reducing the volatility of financial 
markets, the result may be to increase it, or that any 
benefits obtained would be more than offset by the 
administrative and compliance costs such levies will 
impose. Others have said that it would either prove 
impossible to administer such taxes or that over time 
any initial effects would inevitably be cancelled out by 
market adjustments. Still others have emphasized that 
the tax will reduce investment and growth and hence 
jobs or eliminate good jobs in the financial sector or 
require giving up some sovereignty to unelected (and 
presumably untrustworthy) foreigners. 
On the other side of the debate, the recent discussion 
about the bad behavior of the financial sector and the 
perceived need to impose additional forms of regulation 
and taxation on this sector (both to compensate the rest 
of us for their past errors and to prevent them imposing 
similar negative externalities in the future) implicitly 
implies that Wall Street interests of the wealthy few have 
dominated the Main Street concerns of the less wealthy 
many. In reality, however, as Eichengreen (1996, 283) 
noted, this dichotomy does not describe present reality. 
Most of us now live on Wall Street in the sense that we 
are all engaged to some extent, whether we are aware 
of it or not, in an international market: most businesses 
are, directly or indirectly, affected by what happens in 
interdependent international financial markets  as are 
all households with pensions or other assets (including 
housing). It follows that measures affecting those markets 
are in all likelihood going to flow through and affect all 
of us, and not always in obvious ways.  For example, 
although the final incidence of global taxes – in other 
words, whose real income is affected -- is seldom if ever 
confined solely to those who pay the money over to the 
taxman, even if much of the tax ended up taxing savers 
and investors it would still be progressive (Michalos 
1997).  Nonetheless, even in democracies dominated by 
the middle class (that is, those who have some assets) a 
critical mass of voters may be unhappy with this result. 
Perhaps if such taxes were to be coupled with higher 
taxes on the rich (and perhaps also more support for the 
marginal middle class) and hence reduced inequality, 
especially in terms of opportunity, they may become 
accepted (Bird and Zolt 2013) but these deep and dark 
waters cannot be further explored here. 
34The settlement institution envisaged in Taskforce (2010) is based on the Continuous Linked Settlement Bank, a privately organized network of banks providing an 
institutional framework for trading in most world currencies.
35The related remark by another international expert that “…the idea of an autonomous international tax institution has, perhaps, arrived” (Shome, 1995, 25) has, 
it seems, turned out to be rather optimistic. 
36He attributes this useful categorization to Hirschman (1991).
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Well before the recent concern about the potentially 
undesirable effects of cross-border currency flows and 
financial speculation other forms of global taxation 
had been suggested as possible ways to achieve two 
apparently contradictory ends -- discouraging activities 
which demonstrably (or at least arguably) harmed others 
than those who decided to carry out such activities and 
at the same time producing additional revenue.  The idea 
of using taxes to offset the mispricing (or divergence 
between private and social costs) that may induce 
private decision-makers to take actions that impose costs 
(negative externalities) on others has of course long been 
familiar in the form of so-called Pigouvian taxes (after 
Pigou 1920). Only in recent decades, however, has this 
concept received much emphasis in the global context, 
particularly with respect to the issue of financing global 
public goods.37 Four examples of such taxes are taxes on 
the arms trade, taxes on tobacco, taxes on international 
transportation, and, most importantly, taxes on carbon 
emissions more generally.  By far the most important of 
these is the last, which – together with the related issue 
of taxing international transport -- is discussed in this 
section. The other possible “externality” taxes mentioned 
are discussed more briefly in the next section. 
Taxing International Transportation
Global tax proposals relating to aviation and shipping 
have largely been made in the context of discouraging 
carbon emissions. Perhaps partly for this reason, 
such proposals have often ignored the existence of a 
myriad of existing international agreements that shape 
the present national tax systems on such traffic and 
distribute revenues between countries (Keen, Parry 
and Strand 2013). For example, Oxfam (2011) proposed 
a tax of $25 per metric ton (tonne) of carbon emission 
as a way of taxing the estimated 3 percent of carbon 
emissions coming from international shipping.  As is not 
uncommon in this literature, the proposal focuses less on 
the technical and institutional way in which such a levy 
might be implemented or on its effects and more on the 
more politically attractive question of how to allocate 
its proceeds. Forty percent of the revenue was to go to 
developing countries to offset increased shipping costs 
with at least a similar share going to a Green Climate 
Fund which would also be directed to developing 
Global Environmental Taxes
countries to help them adapt to climate change and 
control their emissions.  The balance was to be spent on 
developing cleaner shipping.  Allocating funds in such 
ways is presumably intended to muster political support 
for the proposal.  
However, since the real benefits from taxing negative 
externalities are associated with the tax rather than 
the expenditure, more attention should be paid to 
the fact that agreement on the need for international 
cooperation is required from developed and developing 
countries as well as the industry if such taxes are to 
be successfully implemented (Keen, Parry and Strand 
2013).  Much the same may be said with respect to 
taxing international air travel.  As in the case of shipping 
-- and indeed with respect to reducing carbon emissions 
in general – a sensible way to launch any reform in this 
area would seem to be to focus first on the substantial 
extent to which the carbon-emitting activities associated 
with international transport are now in effect subsidized 
through under-taxation, in part owing to deliberate 
national policy decisions and in part as a the result of the 
network of international agreements on the taxation of 
such activities that have evolved over the years.38
The idea of imposing global taxes on international 
air travel as a means of financing development was 
suggested at least 50 years ago (Seers 1964).  Unlike 
most such proposals, however, this idea became a reality 
at least to a limited extent when nine countries (France 
and a number of developing countries) imposed a small 
tax on air passenger tickets – the so-called solidarity 
contribution -- in 2009, with the proceeds going to 
UNITAID.39 The tax varies in different countries but in 
2013 in France it was imposed at the rate of I euro for a 
domestic economy seat, 10 euros for a higher-class seat, 
6 euros for an international economy seat and 40 euros 
for a higher-class international seat.    
UN (2012) suggests that one reason this small levy 
appears to have been accepted by the public is because 
it is earmarked for a popular cause. This hypothesis 
appears to be untested. An interesting recent study by 
Kaufman, McGuirk, and Vicente (2012) suggests that, 
even though survey evidence indicates that people in 
most countries believe their country spends much more 
on foreign aid than it actually does, it also shows that 
37See the references cited in note 7 above.
38For more on the subsidy issue, see the discussion of fossil fuel subsidies below as well as the discussion of the specific arrangements in international 
transportation in Keen, Parry and Strand (2013).
39Arguments supporting such a tax may be found, for example, in WHO (2009). On UNITAID, see note 8 above.
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they would nonetheless like to see even higher levels of 
aid than those they perceive.40  Two notable exceptions 
to this conclusion are the US and Japan, where perceived 
aid levels exceed desired aid levels. Even in these 
countries, however, the data suggest that most people 
would still apparently support increasing aid above its 
current level.41  Counterbalancing the apparently high 
degree of support for increased foreign aid in some 
EU countries, an early EU working paper on the tax on 
air tickets concluded the amount likely to be collected 
from a voluntary surcharge on such tickets might not 
be sufficient even to pay for the cost of administering 
the system (Commission 2005).   When the EU included 
international air flights in its more general Emissions 
Trading System (see below) in January 2012 for flights to 
and from European airports, in effect it introduced such 
a carbon tax (though one that produced no revenue). 
Subsequently, however, the EU first suspended the tax 
for flights to and from non-member states and then, in 
October 2013, revised the tax so that it applies only to 
the portion of such flights occurring within EU territory 
(and with flights to and from many developing countries 
being exempted). 
Taxing Carbon Emissions42 
Fifty years ago high school students were, at least in 
Canada, told more about the prospect of a ‘little ice 
age’ than about the dangers of global warming.  Times 
have changed. One of the most striking results of the 
substantial scientific work on climate change that has 
been carried out in recent years has been to reinforce the 
case that not only is something is going on with respect to 
global warming but that we should do something about 
it.  Even Canadians, who react like others to pictures of 
lonely polar bear cubs floating on an ice floe in their 
rapidly receding frozen north, are becoming worried. In 
1997, after lengthy discussion and negotiation, the first 
binding international agreement on climate change, the 
Kyoto Protocol, to which most countries in the world 
were parties, came into effect in 2005.43 The United States 
neither signed nor ratified the Protocol (and Canada, 
which had done both, formally withdrew in 2012). In 
contrast, the EU not only signed and ratified the Protocol 
but introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme as its major 
instrument for emissions reduction.  A recent review of 
several dozen studies of the effectiveness of this scheme 
in reducing carbon emissions and its possible effects on 
growth and employment concludes that, on the whole, 
the results of such studies may best be summed up as 
“not conclusive” (Martin, Muuls and Wagner 2012).  
Nordhaus (2011) goes further and argues that not only 
has the Kyoto Protocol failed to produce any noticeable 
reduction in global emissions but that its “inefficient 
and opaque” approach to the problem does not provide 
a sound basis for dealing with the problem of climate 
change arising from carbon emissions.  This conclusion is 
not surprising.  As Norhaus (2011, 10) says, “…thousands 
of governments, millions of firms, billions of people, all 
making trillions of decisions each year – need to face 
realistic prices for the use of carbon if their decisions 
about consumption, investment, and innovation are to 
be appropriate.” To bring such results about is not easy 
in a world in which obligations can be imposed on a 
sovereign state only with its consent. The bottom line 
is that everyone – or at least most -- may perhaps be 
able to agree at some point that we should do a better 
job in controlling carbon emissions.  But it is difficult to 
measure the relevant costs and benefits of doing so given 
the complexity (and time dimension) of the problem and 
there are major distributional concerns with respect 
to both costs and benefits. Uncertainty combined with 
conflicting interests is a recipe for delay and inaction, as 
the climate debate has amply demonstrated. 
The world has, over the centuries, managed to develop 
various instruments and institutions that with varying 
40Economists are sometimes a bit skeptical of results based on even the best-constructed survey data.  Hirschman and Bird (1968) suggested years ago that one 
way to test the extent to which taxpayers were really willing to support foreign aid might be by permitting them to earmark a small fraction of their income taxes 
for this purpose, but no one appears to have done so.  Even in the (unusually and consistently generous) Nordic countries the linkage between how much (and 
what kind of) aid the public would support if they had the choice and what is actually done by their governments seems rather tenuous (Selbervik and Nygaard 
2006).
41Kaufman, McGuirk, and Vicente (2012) suggest that one way to reduce what they label the ‘democratic deficit’ between the aid people seem to want to support 
and the amount of actual aid might be for governments to ‘match’ charitable expenditure abroad in the same way as they match (usually through the tax system) 
charitable donations domestically.  This is already done to a limited extent in some countries; in Canada, for example, foreign donations are given the same tax 
treatment as domestic donations when given to a charity to which the government has itself given funds.
42Many government policies affect the ‘price’ of carbon emissions such as energy efficiency standards, fuel taxes, and support for renewable energy.  However, only 
emissions trading schemes, carbon taxes, and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies are considered here. Other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such as nitrous oxide 
are not discussed.
43The Kyoto Protocol committed countries to meet international binding targets for reducing GHG emissions, with heavier burdens being placed on developed 
countries as being primarily responsible for the increased GHG found in the atmosphere: see http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.  For a useful 
overview of the lack of effective enforcement under this agreement, see Gillenwater (2013). As usual with such international agreements, the targets set are 
mandatory only to the extent that countries voluntarily live up to them.
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Table 4 
Carbon Taxes and Emission Trading Regimes (ETR) 
 
Jurisdiction  Year 
Introduced 
Rate 
US 
$/tonnea 
Baseb Estimated
Coverage of 
Emissions 
Comments
EU  2005    CO2 and two 
other gas 
emissions 
45% ETR
Canada: 
Quebec 
2007  $9.89  30% ETR Auction reserve price, to 
increase by 5% plus inflation 
annually 
Canada: BC  2008  $39  Fossil fuels Offset by lower CIT, PIT
US: California  2012  $14  45% ETR Auction reserve price, to 
increase by 5% plus inflation 
annually 
Denmark  1992  $26  Fuels other than 
petroleum 
To increase annually by 1.8% 
until 2015 
Finland  1990  $39‐$78  Fossil fuels Rate depends on fuel type
Ireland  2010  $26  Fossil fuels
Netherlands  1990    Fossil fuels
Norway  1991  $4‐$71  Mineral oil, 
gasoline and 
natural gas 
Rate depends on fuel type and 
usage 
Slovenia  1997  $20 
Sweden  1991  $163  Fixed rate 
Switzerland  2008  $19  10% Fixed rate 
UK  2001  $7  Carbon price floor; scheduled 
to increase to 2020 
Australia  2012  $24  60% ETR Fixed price, to increase by 
2.5% plus inflation 
China  2013    35‐60% Pilot ETR in 2 provinces and 5 
cities 
India  2010    Coal
Japan  2012  $3  Fossil fuels 20% ETR in 3 cities. Price scheduled 
to increase gradually over next 
few years 
Kazakhstan  2013    50% ETR
Korea  2015    60% ETR
New Zealand  2008  $0.85  50% ETR Fixed price ceiling
South Africa  2015   $14  Substantial exemptions for 
most firms. To be increased by 
10% a year until 2020 
Notes: This table combines incomplete and not always compatible information from several different sources for 
illustrative purposes only.  (a) 2013 prices per metric ton of CO2. (b) Base is usually carbon content of fuels unless 
otherwise indicated. All countries also apply other taxes on motor fuels and most exempt certain uses.   
Sources: World Bank (2013); OECD (2013c); Vivid Economics (2012); various news sources on specific countries. 
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degrees of success attempt to deal with such problems. 
Good arguments that are persuasive to most economists 
(Nordhaus 2011) can be made in favor of carbon taxes 
instead of the type of quantity regulation embodied in 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Since, as mentioned earlier, it is the 
tax and not how it is spent that is important, the simplest 
approach would seem to be to let countries collect any 
agreed uniform carbon tax and spend it as they wish. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine how to develop 
and implement the conceptually ideal system of a uniform 
tax on carbon emissions from every source everywhere in 
the world. Even in the EU, where concerns about global 
warming have had most effect on policy, most such 
policies have tended to take the form of quantitative 
controls, regulation, and subsidization of supposedly 
more carbon-efficient alternatives such as renewable 
energy sources (wind, solar) rather than tackling the deep 
public reluctance (and industry resistance) with respect 
to the outright imposition of carbon taxes.  No one really 
knows how best to achieve the best policy outcomes 
through the regulatory approach and, as experience in 
many fields suggests, as a rule that it is not all that difficult 
to manipulate regulations (and regulators) to generate 
rents for some while failing to produce the apparently 
clear and precise outcomes they seem to offer.   
A carbon tax – a simple levy of a fixed amount per unit 
of carbon emissions - is preferable to the more complex 
approach of an emissions trading scheme, which places 
a limit on total emissions and allows permits, up to that 
cap, to be traded in order to establish a uniform price 
for the ‘right’ to produce carbon emissions.  The tax 
approach has several advantages.  Taxes yield revenues, 
whereas most existing emission trading schemes, such 
as that for carbon emissions in the EU, basically give the 
right to emit pollutants away to existing producers, thus 
dissipating any potential revenue.  To avoid this outcome, 
some jurisdictions (e.g. California) have auctioned 
off allowances rather than dispensing them for free. 
However, the second advantage of a tax – that it is fixed 
– cannot be so easily attained with an emission trading 
scheme even when allowances are auctioned because 
the price of emissions will vary, thus creating potentially 
distortionary effects on investment and production 
decisions. To deal with this problem, additional provisions 
are needed to stabilize emission prices, essentially by 
government setting floor and ceiling prices and selling 
additional allowances when prices near the ceiling and 
buying them when they near the floor. As Keohane (2009) 
and others have argued, in principle with careful design 
and management one can craft an emissions trading 
scheme that would achieve the same results as a simple 
uniform carbon tax.  In practice, however, as the existing 
array of ETRs set out in Table 4 suggests, no one has come 
close to doing so.44 Finally, taxes are simpler to administer 
than ETRs and do not require the creation of a new 
regulatory authority. In short, though far from simple, 
carbon taxes are easier to design, simpler to administer, 
and more likely to be effective than equivalent regulatory 
approaches.  Nonetheless, as Table 4 shows, although a 
number of early adopters like the Nordic countries did 
impose such taxes on fossil fuels, most recent adopters 
have instead favored various versions of ETR whether 
at the subnational, national, regional, or -- as the Kyoto 
Protocol shows -- global level. 
The reasons why most countries prefer the more complex 
(and uncertain) ETR approach over carbon taxation are 
primarily political.  That a carbon tax produces revenue 
may be seen to be a problem rather than an advantage for 
two distinct reasons.  First, some may object to additional 
taxes of any sort, and such protests will undoubtedly be 
heard even if the revenues from the carbon tax are used 
to replace other, more obviously distorting taxes, such 
as corporate income taxes.  There are always both losers 
and gainers with any tax change.  Because losers are 
seldom happy to lose while gainers are often unaware 
that they have gained, the political calculus inevitably 
favors losers. Secondly, if the revenues are indeed 
additional – and perhaps even if they are not – there are 
always arguments about whether other taxes should be 
lowered or if expenditures should be increased and, if 
so, which expenditures.  Some will argue for more to the 
poor, others for compensatory expenditures to regions, 
industries or groups that may lose from the imposition 
of the tax, and still others for earmarking revenues to 
activities seen to serve the same goal of environmental 
improvement such as expanding solar and wind power 
generation.45 In contrast, an emissions trading scheme 
may appear to be a winner from a political perspective 
(perhaps especially if it inefficiently allocates existing 
producers tradable emissions rights for free) since 
governments can then claim to be doing ‘something’ 
without appearing to hurt anyone.46
44For descriptions of existing market-based mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions in the form of both emission trading regimes and taxes, see OECD (2013c) 
and World Bank (2013).
45The same phenomenon may emerge with an emission trading scheme if firms are permitted to satisfy their quota by spending on such emission-reducing 
activities instead of reducing emissions directly.  In practice, it appears to have been difficult to measure and verify such offsets (Keen, Parry and Strand 2013). 
46A more comprehensive model of the political distortions that may arise from both the regulatory and the taxation approach to dealing with externalities by 
Masciandaro and Passarelli (2012) shows that both approaches are all too likely to end up being distorting.  Determining which is more likely to be better given the 
national, let alone international, political setting requires knowing a number of things that we are, alas, unlikely to know.  Life is difficult to model. 
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The long-standing debate about carbon taxation received 
new impetus recently when the IMF (2013) issued a 
report (responding to earlier G-20 communiques in 2009 
and 2012) concluding that not only are additional taxes 
on carbon emissions needed but that it is also essential 
in pricing properly the economic damage created by 
carbon pollution to eliminate the subsidies for fossil fuel 
use that exist in many countries. Like all proposals for 
carbon taxes, the IMF report was immediately criticized 
– for one example, see Lewis (2013) -- for many reasons, 
some plausible (such as the uncertainty of many of 
the estimated parameters) but many seemingly based 
on little more than simple assertions about the evil of 
the (presumed) international control of the revenue or 
about how badly it would be used even if spent by the 
governments that collected it.  However, almost none 
of these criticisms weaken the strong case made in IMF 
(2013) for reducing subsidies to fossil fuels.
Reducing Fossil Fuel Subsidies 
Indeed, subsidies to the production and consumption 
of fossil fuels in many countries are so inefficient and 
inequitable and the budgetary impact of eliminating 
them so obvious (IMF 2013) that it is surprising that so 
much effort has been spent on reaching an international 
agreement on carbon emissions control through 
regulation and taxation when it may appear to be so 
much easier just to revise bad subsidy policy.47 Of course, 
even if all subsidies are abolished a strong case could still 
be made for additional carbon taxation (IMF 2013), but it 
appears to be at least as hard to take away a subsidy as 
it is to impose a new tax.  A country – indeed the world 
– may well lose in environmental as well as budgetary 
terms from subsidizing fossil fuels and, as McLure (2013) 
shows, the benefits of such subsidies may flow mainly to 
those with higher incomes (and hence more ways to use 
cheap fuel).  Nonetheless, it is always and everywhere 
difficult to take a fiscal benefit away from anyone 
without giving them something roughly equally valuable 
in return.48
Subsidies provide jobs for some (e.g. coal miners), direct 
benefits for others (e.g. vehicle owners), and to some 
extent indirect benefits to everyone (e.g. through lower 
transport costs).  The sum total of these benefits may 
be less than the costs imposed on the country (not to 
mention on the world as a whole) by the combination of 
the less efficient use of scarce investible resources and 
the external costs of increased pollution arising from the 
subsidy.  However, such costs are – apart from such highly 
visible instances as a bad air day in Beijing – difficult to 
understand compared to the headlines generated by the 
direct and visible losses to some that result from reducing 
fuel subsidies.  Many governments require the support 
of those who lose from altering subsidies, and it is not 
surprising that attempts to reduce subsidies have often 
aroused strong and sometimes violent public opposition 
(e.g. from taxi drivers and farmers) with the result that 
governments wishing to stay in power have soon backed 
down and restored the subsidies.
Nonetheless, fossil fuel subsidies are almost always a bad 
idea, for many reasons:49
• They discourage investment in the energy 
sector50
• They may crowd out growth-enhancing public 
spending (e.g. on education)
• They diminish the long-term competitiveness of 
the private sector
• They create incentives for smuggling
• They make it more difficult to deal with the 
volatility of international energy prices
• They complicate budgetary management
• They create substantial negative externalities 
(ranging from global warming to such more local 
concerns as pollution, excessive vehicle traffic, 
and overuse of irrigation pumps) and hence 
environmental and health costs51
• They increase global energy demand and prices
• They often – indeed, in all likelihood, almost 
always -- are inequitable and mainly benefit 
higher-income groups.
47As McLure (2013) documents, fossil fuel subsidies use up over 10 percent of budgetary revenues in at least 21 poor countries, including such giants as India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Egypt as well as such other countries as Thailand, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Malaysia and most oil-producing countries.  He reports that, for the 
37 countries for which the International Energy Agency (IEA) had complete data for 2011, the average fossil fuel subsidy rate was 24 percent, with 54 percent of 
the total subsidy going to the consumption of oil products, 20 percent to natural gas, and the balance mainly to electricity generated by fossil fuels.
48For further development (in a different context) of the concept that an implicit ‘fiscal contract’ underlies  politically sustainable fiscal policy in most countries, see 
Bird and Zolt (2013).
49This list is based largely on IMF (2013).
50Incidentally, subsidies to forms of energy production that are less obviously polluting – biomass, wind, solar – are themselves often distorting and may have 
undesired effects.
51As Zivin and Naedel (2013) document, there is increasing evidence that the negative impact of worsening environmental conditions on growth and well-being is 
even stronger than previously thought. 
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These are strong arguments. There is a good case in both 
environmental and fiscal terms for reducing fossil fuel 
subsidies in many countries (McLure 2013), although 
doing so may, like any changes in energy prices, raise 
complex political and technical issues.   
Summing Up
By far the most important form of global tax intended 
to counter negative externalities is a tax levied on the 
carbon content of fossil fuel   -- in effect, a form of carbon 
pricing that would act like an environmental fee on the 
production, distribution or use of fossil fuels such as oil, 
coal and natural gas. The amount of the tax depends on 
how much carbon dioxide each type of fuel emits when 
it is used to run factories or power plants, provide heat 
and electricity to homes and businesses, drive vehicles 
and  so on.52  Many varieties of taxes have been discussed 
under this general heading – Climate Change Levy, Fuel 
Tax, Motor Fuel Tax, Coal Tax, Car Taxes.  Importantly, 
unlike many of the proposed ‘global’ taxes discussed in 
this paper, various forms of carbon taxes have actually 
been introduced in a number of countries in recent years, 
as shown in Table 4, in addition to the substantial taxes 
imposed for more purely fiscal reasons on motor fuels in 
almost all countries.53
Of course, there remain serious political problems in 
working out how to deal with such global problems owing 
in large part to the differing inter- and intra-country 
distributional impacts of corrective policies.  When so 
many countries, from the richest to the poorest, have 
been unable to move very far in this direction even when 
there is strong evidence (as in the case of reducing fossil 
fuel subsidies) of the direct benefits to them from doing 
so, the prospects for sensible global policy on carbon 
emissions remain remote.  It took the great smog of 1952 
in London, which killed at least 4000 and left at least 
100,000 people ill, for England to adopt the Clean Air Act 
of 1956, which ended the choking yellow smog that had 
for decades blanketed its capital city.54  Something similar 
may be happening in China now, where the recently 
launched effort to reduce air pollution has no doubt 
been stimulated at least in part by the fact that, as in the 
case of London, national leaders, like other inhabitants 
of the capital, are enjoying the benefits of bad air.55 Short 
of an equally visible and dramatic crisis on the world 
level, it may be a long time – perhaps too long – before 
enough leaders in enough countries are willing to act in 
a sufficiently coordinated and cohesive way to deal with 
carbon emissions.  
The path to success in this field, as with respect to all 
global public goods, is thus unlikely to be either straight-
forward or quick.  The answer, if any, as just mentioned 
may emerge from some cataclysmic event that leads to 
immediate universal agreement. Alternatively, it may 
emerge from a set of complex, partial, and lengthy 
decisions in response to various specific issues as yet 
another example of the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ that 
seems often to describe the evolution of institutions as 
well as species (Mahoney 2012).  As with trade in the 
decades after World War Two -- and to a lesser extent 
with taxes over the century since World War One (as 
discussed below) -- the world may continue, no doubt 
painfully, imperfectly, and gradually to work out ways to 
deal with international environmental issues until enough 
decision-makers in enough countries decide that they 
have to do something about the problem.  In the end, 
although the Kyoto Protocol was arguably premature 
and flawed in some respects, it may perhaps be seen as 
one of the first steps on the long and crooked path to 
working out how to reconcile national sovereignty with 
appropriate global adaptation to climate change.   
The case for a global approach to carbon emissions is 
probably stronger and more important than the case for 
any other global tax.  In some ways, however, the friends 
of such ideas have at times been as unhelpful as such 
obvious enemies as those who would directly lose as a 
result of proposed changes. Demanding that perfect 
policies be immediately adopted in a world in which 
history shows that progress towards almost any goal is 
as a rule accomplished only incrementally is to ask for 
disappointment.  Purists -- who to most people seem 
all too willing to sacrifice the immediate well-being of 
others for the possible long-term betterment of future 
generations -- are unlikely to win the day unless and 
until the accumulated (and visible) evidence that change 
is needed is clear to all.  For example, to say that even 
such a (large) incremental change as reducing fossil fuel 
subsidies is insufficient and inadequate compared to the 
52While all quantitative estimates in this field are subject to qualification and often highly sensitive to assumptions about discount rates and other factors, the most 
recent official estimate of this cost in the US (for 2010) was $35 per ton of  CO2 (IWAG 2013), a figure that is higher than most existing carbon taxes (see Table 
4).  However, even in the data-rich environment of the United States, it can at times be surprisingly difficult to determine the precise allocative and distributional 
effects of changes in energy prices (Davis 2014).
53As Miller and Vela (2013) show, taxes on motor fuel significantly reduce pollution. 
54The figures cited come from an official source (http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/education/teens/case-studies/great-smog); other sources give higher estimates. 
55See http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1341969/severe-air-pollution-spikes-beijing,
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immediate and full-hearted adoption of a global ETR is 
like saying that taking two steps in the right direction 
is useless unless one gets to the goal immediately.  At 
best, such comments may remind us that there is still a 
long way to go; at worst, however, they may discourage 
us from even attempting to move in the right direction, 
not least when added to the chorus of negative voices 
inevitably raised by those whose direct interests are 
affected by such changes.  As Harrison (2013) suggests 
in an interesting analysis of the British Columbia 
experience with carbon taxation, for instance, it seems 
often to take a chain of coincidences – a surge in public 
concern about climate change, a government with the 
trust of the business community, the availability of less-
polluting sources of energy, and committed leadership 
– for a carbon tax to be adopted, and even more for it 
to be sustained.  But it can be done, although it is most 
unlikely to be done immediately, easily, or evenly around 
the world.  
The case for a carbon tax does not rest on any specific 
use being designated for the revenues. However, the 
political acceptability of any such levy may in practice 
depend on if and how the funds are earmarked, for 
example, to finance ‘clean’ technology or to compensate 
low-income households for increased costs owing to such 
taxes.  Countries should be left to direct the revenues 
they collect as they see fit.  Taxes collected or spent by an 
international agency seem far less likely to be acceptable 
than taxes imposed and spent nationally.  How to 
achieve coordination of a global scale with such taxes is 
a sufficiently difficult issue.  To attempt at the same time 
to take the further leap of redirecting the funds to other 
countries makes the task far more difficult. 
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Taxing the Arms Trade
An interesting global tax that has been suggested at least 
in part as a way of moving  the world closer to peace is 
a Tax on the International Arms Trade (sometimes called 
a Weapons Tax or a Gun Tax) to be imposed on arms 
sales and possibly individual gun purchases. However, 
this tax appears to be not only one of the least well 
developed proposals but also one of the least likely to be 
implemented.  Apparently first suggested by Mahbub ul 
Haq (1976) and since revived at various times by the then 
Presidents of France and Brazil as well as others (Brzoska 
2004) neither the case for such a tax nor how it might be 
implemented has ever been well developed.56
Despite the obvious difficulty of taxing illegal trade, a 
tax on the international arms trade is simply another tax 
on international trade, and should be technically easier 
to implement than taxes on either finance or carbon. 
Curiously, however, most proponents of such taxes 
appear to ignore the tricky question of tax incidence and 
to assume that they would be paid by arms exporters 
in rich countries rather than by the people of poor 
importing countries, as Brzoska (2004) correctly argues is 
much more likely. Apart from such intellectual confusion, 
one reason why such ideas have had so little traction may 
perhaps be, as many have argued for years, that those 
who gain most directly from wars, civil and international 
– the international arms traders themselves – simply have 
too much political influence.57 Another reason, however, 
may be simply because almost everyone, perhaps even 
those who make proposals for taxes to control the arms 
trade, thinks that -- like the famous $200 tax on machine 
guns introduced by the U.S. National Firearms Act in 
1934 (which still exists in law, at the same rate) – such 
proposals are better understood in symbolic terms than 
in terms of their expected impact in practice. 
Other Global Tax Proposals
Taxing Tobacco
The control of communicable diseases (e.g. malaria, 
SARS) is an example of a global public good.  Interestingly, 
however, the most prominent health-related global 
tax proposal relates to smoking, which certainly has 
undesirable health effects but is hardly a communicable 
disease requiring a global Pigouvian tax in order to 
control it.58 Nonetheless, a Global Cigarette (Tobacco) 
Tax, an additional special tax on tobacco -- ideally 
with its proceeds being earmarked to funding health 
programs -- has been strongly urged by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO 2012).59  Health experts have of 
course long emphasized the desirable health effects of 
higher taxes on tobacco (Jha and Pelo 2014), and most 
countries already impose substantial tobacco taxes. 
WHO (2012) notes that the design and administration 
of many such taxes could be substantially improved, 
for example, by monitoring and increasing tax rates as 
necessary to maintain the effective rate in the face of 
inflation and growth and by taxing all tobacco products 
in a comparable way and at similar levels.  Commendable 
as the aims of those advocating higher tobacco taxes 
may be, however, although increasing tobacco taxation 
in many countries may often make sense in terms of 
improving public health outcomes, there seems neither a 
clear case for or a real need for any kind of global tobacco 
tax.60
Taxing Wealth
Other global tax proposals that have surfaced at various 
times, with different objectives, include proposals to 
tax the rich, to tax natural resources, and to tax the 
digital economy. For example, a Global Wealth Tax has 
sometimes been discussed to tax the rich, usually with 
the idea of channelling the revenue to the poor in some 
56Interestingly, although a UN-sponsored international arms trade treaty (available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012-01%20PM/
Ch_XXVI_08.pdf )was accepted by the United Nations in 2013 and has already been signed by over 100 countries, including the United States (although not yet 
ratified by the Senate), the issue of imposing special taxes on such trade was little discussed and plays no role in the treaty.
57For an early example of this argument, see Engelbracht and Hanighen (1934); for a recent update, see http://www.globalissues.org/issue/73/arms-trade-a-major-
cause-of-suffering
58The UNITAID tax on air travel discussed earlier does of course finance work on such diseases.  However, the tax as such, although arguably contributing in a minor 
way to one global public good (reducing carbon emissions) has no meaningful connection with reducing communicable disease.
59Health care in general and health expenditures related to smoking in particular may need additional funding but the case for earmarking the proceeds from 
taxes on smoking to funding these activities is not very strong (as argued in e.g. ITIC 2013). Although this point is not further discussed here, see also Bird and Jun 
(2007).
60An important exception, stressed for example, in Allan (2012) is that tax levels may need to be kept close to those in neighboring countries owing to the relative 
ease of smuggling cigarettes. Canada learned this lesson some years ago when some provinces raised their cigarette taxes for health reasons well above levels in 
the neighboring United States but soon reduced them again to control smuggling, in part because the obvious alternative of increasing border controls worked 
directly against the intent and reality of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and in part because of the serious political problems of dealing with 
smuggling on the First Nations (Indian) lands located on the border (Kelton 2008).
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way.  Such a levy might be based on the aggregate 
value of all household assets, including owner-occupied 
housing; cash, bank deposits, money funds, and savings 
in insurance and pension plans; investment in real 
estate and unincorporated businesses; corporate stock, 
financial securities, and personal trusts.  Another version 
is the so-called Billionaires Tax, consisting of a tax of (say) 
1 per cent on individual wealth holdings of $1 billion or 
more. National wealth taxes, usually imposed at a low 
flat rate, already exist in a number of countries and have 
recently been receiving some support from economic 
studies, although the latter tend to favor taxes on wealth 
transfers.61    In practice neither type of wealth tax has been 
all that popular anywhere in recent decades, although 
even some conservatives are apparently beginning to 
rethink the issue in light of the recent marked increase 
in the wealth of the very wealthiest (McKinnon 2012).62
Taxing Resources
Taxing natural resources has long been a favorite target of 
those concerned with the apparent basic inequity of the 
distribution of the wealth generated by such resources 
between those who, in the terminology often used, 
own them and those who exploit them.  For example, a 
Global Resources Dividend (GRD) has been suggested in 
the form of a tax on the extraction of natural resources, 
with the revenue being used for poverty relief (Pogge 
2008).63 For the last 50 years or so, special attention has 
been paid to the exploitation of what is often called the 
‘global commons’, that is, territory not within national 
boundaries such as Antarctica, outer space, and, most 
extensively, the oceans.  To consider only the last of these, 
in the 1980s 162 countries ratified a UN convention on 
the Law of the Sea though others, including the United 
States, objected to provisions relating to undersea 
mining.  As noted earlier, UN (2012) recently restated 
the case for an agreed global arrangement with respect 
to potential undersea wealth, recommending a Global 
Undersea Resource Royalty in the form of a royalty on 
all undersea mineral resources extraction more than 
100 miles offshore of any nation’s territory.  UN (2012) 
also mentions possible international taxes or fees on 
renewable resources such as certain types of forestry 
exploitation. 
As with tobacco, all countries already tax natural 
resources in some fashion, with such taxes being 
particularly important in a number of developing 
countries.  Considerable attention has been paid in 
recent years to increasing the transparency of both 
national and international fiscal arrangements with 
respect to extractive industries in particular: for example, 
25 developing countries are classified as compliant with 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
with another 16, including the UK and the US, listed 
as candidate countries.64 Many of the world’s largest 
oil and mining companies are also listed as supporters 
(stakeholders) of EITI, which reports data on payments to 
governments from companies based on separate reports 
from companies and governments as reconciled by an 
independent auditing firm (selected by the country). 
Although clearly much could be done to improve the 
effectiveness and impact of this pioneering effort (Anayati 
2012), efforts to extend such work more broadly in terms 
of coverage of both companies and countries may in the 
absence of any real system of global governance perhaps 
turn out to be a more effective way to improve the global 
taxation of this sector – and perhaps eventually of other 
sectors also – than further attempts to introduce more 
explicitly global taxes on natural resources.
Finally, a quite different type of resource tax proposal 
may perhaps still be worth mentioning.  Some years ago, 
there was considerable discussion of an international 
Brain Drain Tax to compensate poor countries for the 
loss represented by the movement of educated people 
to rich countries.  Proposals along this line were put 
forward by Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973) and were 
subsequently discussed in detail by various authors 
(e.g. Bhagwati and Wilson 1989). Although international 
migration (legal and illegal) of skilled and unskilled labor 
remains important, little has been heard recently of the 
interesting theoretical and practical issue of how best to 
tax migrants.65 One reason for this neglect may be in part 
because the earlier discussion was almost completely 
focused on the personal income tax – a tax that, at least 
until very recently, has been much less central to public 
policy discussion in most countries than had earlier been 
the case (Bird and Zolt 2005).  
61For a useful compilation of wealth data for different countries, see Davies (2008); for interesting recent reviews of the case for increased taxation of wealth and 
especially transfers of wealth, see Institute for Fiscal Studies (2010, 2011).
62As one might expect, McKinnon’s opinion piece, when published in the Wall Street Journal, immediately called forth a cascade of (mostly opposing) opinions in 
both the press and the ‘blogosphere.’ Few of those commenting seemed aware of the extensive documentation of the extent to which the slower growth of the 
last few decades has accentuated wealth concentration and inequality: see, for example, Alveredo et al (2013) and Piketty (2014).   
63For interesting discussion of this proposal by philosophers, see the subsequent contributions by Casal (2011), Steiner (2011) and Pogge (2011).  As with any good 
philosophical discussion, the debate has not yet ended.
64See the official web page at http://eiti.org/.
65Although see the interesting suggestion in Wilson (2008).
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Taxing Cyberspace
Some years ago Cordell and Ide (1997) issued a clarion 
call to impose a special tax on the use of ‘cyberspace,’ 
which they called the ‘new wealth of nations.’  Perhaps 
in part because the contemporaneous view of many that 
the digital era had ushered in a completely new economy 
– a belief that justified the marketing of all too many 
over-hyped new high tech companies -- soon proved 
to be false the response to this call was disappointing. 
Recently, however, despite the sobering experiences of 
recent years, this idea has been reborn.  For example, 
WHO (2009) suggested a Global Internet Tax as a way 
of taxing the new digital economy and others have at 
times suggested similar taxes with various names and 
suggested bases – taxes on internet access (levied on ISPs, 
or internet service providers), on email sent or received), 
on bandwidth (speed of internet connection), on ‘bits’ 
(internet usage by volume), on text (or SMS) messages, 
and, more prosaically, on utilities and cable operators.66 
Other than perhaps reflecting the understandable 
annoyance of busy people at unwanted interruptions 
the primary rationale for most of these suggestions was 
probably simply that the increasing size of the potential 
tax base offers an opportunity to generate substantial 
revenue with low tax rates.  Most of the serious opposition 
to such taxation -- excluding the sort of general ranting 
that unfortunately is all too common on internet forums 
– seems to have emphasized the undesirable deterrent 
effect such taxes would presumably have on the spread 
of innovative methods of communication. 
Unfortunately, few who propose such innovative 
tax solutions for the problems of the world seem to 
understand much about how the present tax system works 
or why it works that way.  Looking at old problems with 
fresh eyes may sometimes provide a useful perspective. 
Indeed, a fresh view from outside the fiscal community 
may not only provide an inspiring vision of the ‘city on 
the hill’ to which all good pilgrims should aspire but may 
also suggest potential solutions to current fiscal problems 
that have been missed by those locked in the trench 
warfare of fiscal life.   However, reformers who speak 
from passion and idealism rather than from experience 
and realism seldom seem to understand either the 
real nature of the policies they are advocating  or how 
those policies may interact with or be accommodated 
by the existing international fiscal structure. Much of the 
discussion of taxing the internet – both pro and con -- has, 
for example, has paid little or no attention to the current, 
long-established international arrangements with respect 
to telecommunications systems that carry all this digital 
traffic.  Indeed, when the question of revising the ITU fee 
structure (discussed earlier) came up recently, most of 
the rather vociferous opposition uncovered by a Google 
search seems to rest on the notion that the abstraction 
called the ‘internet’67 should continue to be free – as, 
curiously, many of those involved seemed to think that 
it actually was – with little or no attention to how such 
freedom related to the existing (or potentially attainable) 
international tax regime.68
66Many of these suggestions, with sources, are mentioned in McCullagh and Downes (2012). Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, a text tax was actually 
suggested at one point by the Managing Director of the IMF.
67For an illuminating discussion of the many misconceptions underlying the common usage of this term as if it had a clear and unarguable meaning, see Morozov 
(2013). 
68In contrast, tax experts have produced a substantial literature on the potential erosion of the tax base with the rise of the digital economy. Much of this literature 
is focused on the different treatment of internet sales from ‘brick-and-mortar’ sales under state retail sales taxes in the United States (Fox (2012) provides a useful 
starting point), but there is also a large literature on the international ramifications of digital commerce for a range of taxes:  an early but still useful overview may 
be found in Doernberg et al. (2001).
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As noted earlier, many proposals for global taxes have 
as their aim the goal of providing a more automatic 
and reliable source of financing for the development of 
poorer countries. Such proposals date back at least to a 
proposal for a small tax on selected luxury goods such as 
TVs and dishwashers (UN 1970) and have been the focus 
of many studies of innovative ways to fund development 
finance over the years. Politicians and philosophers have 
put forth a wide variety of other ideas for global taxation, 
ranging from a 2003 proposal by the then President 
of Brazil for a tax on arms sales as way of financing a 
program to end international hunger (Brozka 2004) to a 
more recent proposal by an academic scholar for a global 
tax on resources (Pogge 2008).  
No such idea has as yet produced any significant results, 
however, and none is likely to do so.  A principal reason 
for this pessimistic conclusion is that most such proposals 
have two characteristics in common. First, their prime 
motivation is redistributional: they are explicitly intended 
to redistribute resources to poor countries. Secondly, the 
proceeds of the taxes proposed are usually intended to 
be administered by some international agency rather 
than by the governments of the countries from which the 
revenues are collected.  Each of these characteristics is 
worth discussing briefly.
“Tax justice” has, for example, been called “the lifeblood 
of functioning democracies” and said to lie “at the heart 
of the social contract between citizens and the state” 
(Christian Aid 2013). Viable and sustainable democracies 
do indeed depend to an important extent for their 
sustenance on what is in effect a fiscal contract between 
citizens and state and there is good reason to think that a 
tax system seen as fair constitutes an important element 
of such a contract.69 However, extending this argument 
to the world as a whole assumes that the world can be 
treated as though it is a meaningful political unit -- if 
not a unitary state, at least a federal state.  However, in 
reality the world is not a state in any sense.  Moreover, 
deplorable as it may be, the evidence suggests that most 
who live in rich countries do not care as much for those 
who are so unfortunate as to fall outside their national 
group as they care (reluctantly or otherwise) for those 
with whom they share citizenship (or residence).70
People everywhere identify more with those they know 
than with those they do not, and injustice within one’s 
accepted (or legal) group is taken far more seriously as a 
political matter than injustice between one’s group and 
those outside one’s group. Foreign aid thus is, and always 
has been, a fringe budgetary outlay in most developed 
countries, and most countries have proved reluctant to 
hand over more than a fraction of even this small amount 
to multilateral administration.  People may of course 
be moved by appeals to their better nature, especially 
when the evidence of crisis is placed before their eyes. 
But there is little evidence that any significant number 
of citizens in the developed world are willing to increase 
their tax burdens in order to fund international income 
transfers to even the most worthy candidates, let alone 
to hand over such funds to some international agency 
that decides who gets how much.71 In short, as Christian 
Aid (2013) and other agencies advocating such views 
usually, if reluctantly, recognize, there is regrettably 
little likelihood that the serious imbalances in access 
to resources found in the world today will be quickly 
rectified without major and improbable changes in power 
relationships both between rich and poor countries and, 
often, within individual countries. 
Attempts to remedy this situation by increasing the 
transparency and openness of fiscal arrangements 
(such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
mentioned earlier) are a small but desirable step towards 
this goal.  Much the same can be said of efforts to develop 
workable and perhaps eventually persuasive ways of 
using taxes (among other instruments) in ways that may, 
as Pogge (2011, 352) argues “…slow depletion of natural 
resources and the deterioration of our environment 
while also greatly reducing the huge unjust burdens 
now imposed on the world’s poor.”  More information 
and better understanding may, over time, lead to more 
recognition of the connections between these matters 
and hence to attitudinal changes and eventually even to 
political responses that may begin to move both national 
and international systems towards a better world for 
all.  Of course, even without such action, as economists 
have long argued, and as experience seems clearly to 
have confirmed in recent years, more generalized and 
sustained economic growth will continue to reduce world 
poverty and perhaps, over time, also world inequality.  
Fiscal Justice and Earmarking
69See e.g. Bird and Zolt (2013) and references cited there.
70This assertion may perhaps be acceptable in the present context but of course, like some of the other complex issues touched on in this paper, it is not easily 
documented and has long been discussed, from different perspectives by philosophers (Wellman 2000; Coons 2001), psychologists (Ashmore, Jussim and Wilder 
2001), and economists and political scientists (Gradstein and Konrad 2006; United Nations 2006) among others.
71But see note 40 above and accompanying text.
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Incremental improvements in achieving such goals 
are thus possible on a number of fronts.  However, 
emphasizing the redistributive aspects of global tax 
proposals is unlikely to be a major selling point to the 
people and politicians of rich countries.  Those who 
wish to change the world would find it more productive 
to emphasize proposals that provide not just real gains 
for the less fortunate but some visible gain for almost 
everyone.  For instance, increases in taxes on carbon 
emissions may perhaps at some point come to be seen 
as sufficiently beneficial in the eyes of enough groups 
to overcome the often more immediately politically 
attractive options of regulation and subsidy -- not to 
mention the even more popular option of doing nothing. 
Countries, rich and poor, may come to see the benefits 
of taxing bads of all sorts (pollution, congestion, health-
damaging consumption) rather than, as some now do, 
subsidizing them.  At times it may even make sense to 
tie such levies to certain expenditures: for example, 
properly charging for transport may be feasible only 
if those who pay can see some direct and visible 
compensation, for instance in reduced congestion.  Until 
countries can resolve such relatively simple questions 
sensibly within their own borders, however, regional or 
global initiatives to redistribute funds in a major way 
from rich to poor countries, let alone to extend taxing 
authority, to an international body are unlikely to be 
successful.  On the whole, as Kaul and Le Goulven (2003) 
conclude, disentangling the issue of aid finance from 
that of financing global public goods would improve both 
debates.
One reason countries find it hard to impose good taxes 
on bad activities is because such activities sometimes 
support good jobs in poor places.  Like trade protection, 
subsidies to presumably ‘good’ activities (e.g. renewable 
energy) are frequently justified in part on similar grounds 
and in part on ‘infant industry’ grounds. Over two 
centuries of economic arguments do not seem to have 
weakened the political attractiveness of such measures. 
Those who can tell a good story by generalizing a 
particular (and perhaps atypical) example that seems 
to support their case seem able to carry more weight in 
debate than 100 solid econometric studies that support 
the opposite case.  Much of the debate on global taxes 
has been fought along these lines, with proponents of 
such taxes postulating a utopian world in which we care 
as much about poor peasants in some far away country 
as we do about jobs and income in our own community, 
while opponents postulate an equally unreal world in 
which every dollar shifted away from some existing 
activity not only reduces our income and jobs but is also 
wasted by a rapacious, corrupt and wasteful international 
bureaucracy.  The intellectual debate may, at times, 
seem to be won by those who emphasize altruism and 
internationalism; so far, however, the practical politics 
of taxation remain firmly dominated by self-interest and 
nationalism.  
30 
Most proposals for  global taxes on activities such as 
resource extraction, international transport, and digital 
transactions,  as well as such presumed ‘bads’ as tobacco, 
the arms trade, luxury consumption, and even billionaires 
have several features in common: they have not been 
fully thought through, they are likely to prove difficult 
to administer effectively, it is not clear that their effects 
would be as beneficial as their proponents usually argue, 
and, perhaps most important, it seems unlikely that most 
of them will ever be imposed.  These are serious defects. 
However, they do not mean that discussing global 
taxation is a waste of time and effort.  Indeed, without 
utopian thinking about what a better world might look 
like and how we might get there, and without efforts by 
some to persuade the rest of us of the importance of 
such matters, humanity would perhaps have never left 
the caves and we would find it even more difficult to sort 
out how to cope with the difficulties and problems that 
those who live on this planet currently face.  However, as 
successful revolutionaries soon learn, the thinking, skills 
and efforts needed to overthrow the old regime are not 
those needed to establish a sustainable – let alone better 
– new world.  
Sandler (2001, 107) suggested over a decade ago that 
“the design of supranational structures is about to enter 
a new era in which nations may be prepared, for a few 
specific activities, to sacrifice some autonomy.”  Although 
carefully hedged, this conclusion now seems to have 
been too optimistic.  Indeed, some now think, as The 
Economist recently put it, that “the forward march of 
globalisation has paused since the financial crisis, giving 
way to a more conditional, interventionist and nationalist 
model” (Ip, 2013, 3) and that “the fate of globalisation 
rests on whether America, China and the rest of the world 
see open borders as being in their national interest” (Ip 
2013, 19). But even this considerably restrained view 
may perhaps be too optimistic.  There is nothing new 
about the recent pause in the march to globalization. 
The extent to which sovereign states agree to give up 
any degree of sovereignty remains, as it has always 
been, limited, dependent upon what those who control 
political decisions think is in it for them, and conditional 
on their continuing to perceive that they gain from the 
deal.  As American history from the League of Nations 
(an American initiative that in the end was not accepted 
by the United States) to the Kyoto accord (which the 
United States first agreed with and then failed to affirm) 
suggests, the strengthening of democracy in significant 
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parts of the world in the last few decades may in some 
ways make it even more difficult to make such deals.  The 
interests of the many (or at least the interests of many 
influential groups) and not just those of the ruler (and 
close associates) must now be taken into account.  
A closer look at how over the years countries have 
managed to smooth at least some potential conflicts in 
the fiscal area may offer some lessons with respect to the 
prospects for global taxation.  For example, one proposal 
that has been urged by some as the way to resolve the 
current problems with taxing international income is 
to adopt what is often called unitary taxation (Picciotto 
2013). This term is shorthand for a system of world-wide 
reporting of corporate income with profits apportioned 
to different jurisdictions in which corporations are active 
in accordance with an agreed formula.  Over the years, 
experts have often suggested that the unitary approach 
is a more sensible approach on both conceptual and 
practical grounds to the reality of firms that operate 
across national borders than the current system of 
separate entity accounting, under which a branch or 
subsidiary within the jurisdiction is accounted for as a 
separate entity.72 
Under the current approach transfer prices must be 
estimated for transactions with other parts of the 
corporation or group, with the objective being to produce 
a result as close as possible to that which would emerge 
if all such prices were set at arm’s length by unrelated 
companies.  In practice, however, such estimates are 
generally complicated, uncertain, and often somewhat 
arbitrary.  The outcome of the exercise may bear as little 
relation to reality as does the underlying assumption 
that the parties on both sides of such transactions are 
independent entities rather than components of the 
same company. In contrast, formulary apportionment 
– the approach used to allocate profits to subnational 
jurisdictions within federal countries like the US and 
Canada – is simpler in both concept and practice, 
attributing profits (or losses) to each jurisdiction based 
on such more observable and measurable factors as the 
proportion of sales, assets or payroll in that jurisdiction. 
There are clearly good arguments in principle for this 
approach (Picciotto 2013).  However, the lengthy history 
of international taxation suggests that such a radical 
change in the system is less likely than continuation of the 
traditional process of marginal adjustments by specific 
countries attempting to cope with specific problems in 
specific ways. 
72For example, the present author made such a proposal in Bird and Brean (1986).    
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The rationale for the current approach to taxing cross-
border transactions rests on a stylized set of facts: (i) small 
and evenly-balanced flows of cross border investments; 
(ii) relatively small numbers of companies engaged in 
international operations; (iii) heavy reliance on fixed 
assets for production; (iv) relatively small amounts of 
cross-border portfolio investments by individuals; and 
(v) only minor concerns with international mobility of tax 
bases and international tax evasion.  These assumptions 
do not reflect current reality.  Many business operations 
have changed drastically as production has become 
more dispersed, with different (though integrated) 
operations taking place – in reality or at least in terms 
of fiscally relevant paper -- in different countries.  The 
share of total value-added – the ultimate tax base -- 
arising from services and intangibles has increased to the 
point that it is difficult to locate the source of corporate 
income or taxable activities sufficiently clearly in space 
(or time) for any country to be able to tax that income 
with a demonstrably superior relative claim than other 
countries involved.73
The commonly accepted arm’s length standard for 
measuring and allocating the international income 
of business enterprises among taxing jurisdictions is 
intended to provide a basis for national taxation of the 
“correct” share of such income. As noted above, however, 
to do so this approach applies traditional conventions 
based on separate entity accounting to multinational 
and global corporations that consolidate commercial 
activities organized and operated along functional lines 
according to centers of business interest.  Assuming 
that such economic units can meaningfully be divided 
into legally separate components for tax, management 
accounting or other purposes flies in the face of reality. 
Multinational enterprises exist precisely to avoid the 
costs and limitations of dealings between unrelated 
parties.  The economic rent such firms obtain by operating 
as a single economic entity that avoids these costs and 
limitations cannot be properly captured and allocated by 
the prevalent tax approach. National tax administrations 
need effective institutional ways to tax such enterprises, 
but characterizing them in a manner that directly 
contradicts their essence and manner of operation does 
not provide a promising path to sustainable tax policy. 
Indeed, the effort to make this approach workable may 
result in its becoming so reliant on a series of fictional 
assumptions – conceived initially as practical expedients 
to adjust for possible profit distortions attributable to 
common control -- that over time the inherent weakness 
of this approach is magnified and compounded to the 
point that it becomes unworkable.74   
One path to global taxation might perhaps be to establish 
as clearly as possible the Wicksellian connection 
between taxes and expenditures so that those who pay, 
those who benefit and those who decide are essentially 
in agreement.75 But there is no effective political unit 
within which such ‘fiscal contracts’ between countries 
and interests can be negotiated.  One cannot have either 
global taxes or an effective, coherent and coordinated 
international tax regime without ‘global governance’ -- 
and, as yet, the latter is much more a dream (or, for some, 
perhaps a nightmare) than a reality.  In the absence of any 
effective world governance framework a more workable 
approach may perhaps be to establish small taxes with 
relatively modest goals which can be piggybacked as much 
as possible on existing fiscal and political institutions and 
implemented through a relatively ‘soft’ regime resting 
largely on explicit and implicit agreements between 
states.76 Whatever approach is taken, those interested 
in developing better ways of financing the achievement 
of particular global goods, like those concerned with 
reforming the existing international tax system, should 
perhaps focus more on issues of ‘process’ (how things 
get done) than ‘substance’ (what gets done).  Both are 
important; but if something does not get done it matters 
little how sound it may be in principle since it will not 
exist.
In a globalizing world, countries face a difficult dilemma 
with respect to politics and economics: there is no simple 
way to have both autonomous nation-states and full 
global integration.  The power to tax is a key attribute 
of the modern nation state and no state will readily 
forgo that power. The present international tax regime 
is the outcome of many previous attempts to reconcile 
increasing globalization and national sovereignty.  As 
experience over the last century clearly demonstrates, 
73This paragraph, like much of the remainder of this section, is based in part on Bird and Wilkie (2013).
74For example, the well-known OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 2010) started out as a way to provide valuation guidance in identifying when and to what 
extent there were distortions in the distribution of profit within a group attributable to the possibilities for manipulation engendered by common control. It is far 
from clear that the application of these guidelines as transactional accounting standards is or ever can be adequately matched by the legal concepts and tax law 
provisions needed to give them life.
75For an elaboration of this approach at the sub-national level, see Bird and Slack (2013).
76This concept comes close to Krasner’s classic definition of an international regime (1982, 186) as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” For an excellent review of the global governance literature as it 
applies to international tax issues, see Eccleston (2012). 
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countries are more willing to forgo full integration than 
to give up state power.  Much of the discussion of global 
taxation does not face up adequately to this central 
problem in a world in which there is no world government 
with the moral, political or economic basis for imposing 
taxes.  An efficient global Tobin tax, for example, may well 
be technically possible (Taskforce 2013). But it is likely to 
be politically feasible only if countries are guaranteed that 
those who are taxed have full control over the amount 
of revenues collected and how it is spent-- that is, if the 
system is run by real (imperfect) national tax regimes and 
not by some mythical (perfect) supranational entity. 
Another approach is to focus on the practical regulatory 
dimension of the emerging new world economic and tax 
policy order. The seeds of such an international approach 
to tax regulation may be found in various more or less 
formal interactions of tax policy and regulatory authorities 
such as the OECD’s Global Tax Forum and others.77 
Countries have increasingly been sharing financial and 
tax information through a plethora of Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) in addition to information 
exchange arrangements contained in bilateral tax treaties. 
In principle such agreements are intended to limit the 
possibility that income can be hidden from interested 
tax authorities although success in this respect remains 
elusive.78 One way or another, both tax administrators 
and tax policy makers are becoming increasingly well 
informed about and influenced by developments and 
approaches in other countries. 
No country is going to abandon tax claims in favor of the 
interests of another country when it comes to taxpayers 
with observable connections to both unless there is a 
significant reason to do so in its own interests. Countries 
act, at best, in the interests of the ‘national welfare’ of 
their citizens, not some abstract conception of ‘world 
welfare’; at worst, they may act mainly in the interests 
of those with substantial economic or political influence. 
Whatever the motivation, it is this axis of interest – 
countries acting as if they were economic actors in 
relation to each other through their respective taxpayers 
– that underlies the internationalization of tax policy and 
rules and has given rise to the complex administrative 
web of tax treaties, information sharing, transfer pricing 
agreements among taxpayers and tax administrations, 
and the like.  Looking at the way in which international 
taxation currently works, it is difficult to discern that 
anyone involved has been thinking very clearly about 
the objective of international tax policy. Provisions such 
as those on controlled foreign corporations and foreign 
tax credits found in national tax laws, like the many tax 
treaties that now exist, are at best pragmatic attempts 
to accommodate the many physical and legal ways in 
which commercial activities actually take place by adding 
on particular features to tax laws developed essentially 
for domestic purposes, with little attention being paid 
to how such new international features interact with 
domestic tax policy objectives let alone achieve any more 
global objective.  
Nonetheless, although no one can be quite sure what 
is going on and why, for many years taxpayers and their 
various governments have one way and another, through 
language and through commercial relations, been 
communicating with each other to the point that, at 
least in conceptual terms, it is perhaps not unreasonable 
to argue that a sort of loose confederation of a number 
of more developed national tax systems has emerged. 
This construct is in some ways not all that different in 
some respects from the more formal arrangements 
that exist within federal countries to co-ordinate the 
contemporaneous application of national and subnational 
taxes on similar income and consumption bases.   One 
reading of the extensive literature on taxation in federal 
states, like the broader literature on decentralization in 
general, is that what may at first seem to be the costly 
duplication of functions and unnecessary costs of 
coordination inherent in a decentralized decision system 
compared to a single monopoly decision-maker may 
in reality both provide useful redundancy in a complex 
system coping with constantly changing conditions and 
an increased possibility that innovative solutions may 
emerge as a result of involving different decision centers. 
Similar arguments may perhaps hold in the even more 
heterogeneous and changeable international setting. Of 
course, a quite different interpretation is also possible: 
current international tax rules and practices may be 
interpreted not as the outcome (given coordination costs 
and conflicting objectives) of a rational process but as 
little more than a last ditch rationalization for clinging to 
outmoded practices and constraints.  Time will tell which 
characterization is closer to reality. 
77A recent overview of many of the issues discussed here may be found in OECD (2013).  Relevant groups include the Forum of Tax Administrators (FTA), a panel of 
national tax administrators established in 2002 by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs to promote dialogue between administrations; the Leeds Castle Group, 
a group of tax administrators from a number of major countries, including some non-OECD countries like China and India, who meet regularly to discuss mutual 
compliance problems; and the Joint International Tax Shelter Center established by the U.S., U.K., Canada and Australia to develop and share information on 
abusive tax avoidance.
78For an optimistic view of the prospects for future international tax information exchange and cooperation, see Grinberg (2013).  For considerably more restrained 
appraisals of these prospects, from two very different perspectives, see Shaviro (2014) and Eccleston (2012).
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Taking the more positive perspective, however, there 
appears to be increasing realization that competing tax 
systems are moving in this direction, as evidenced by 
heightened awareness and responsiveness in each country 
to the economic and tax policy characteristics of other 
tax systems.  One outcome may be that such theoretical 
concepts as inter-nation equity (fair international sharing 
arrangements) may over time become more important.79 
At present, however, as Lang and Owens (2013) note, the 
international tax regime falls far short of satisfying any 
conceivable distributional goal.  Tax treaties, for example, 
are mainly geared to the interests of richer (residence) 
countries, and some observers such as Thuronyi (2010) 
have suggested that most developing countries might be 
better off not signing such treaties, essentially because 
the degree of ‘reciprocity’ (reciprocal gain) critical for 
attaining a mutually beneficial outcome is unlikely to be 
present. Indeed, even within residence countries treaties 
inevitably reflect the fundamental tension between 
their two conflicting objectives: to raise more revenues 
from residents while at the same time attracting more 
investment from abroad. Both within and between 
countries, it seems, more explicit and transparent 
discussion and, one must hope,  agreement as to who 
should tax what and how much is needed, if countries 
are to be able to tax international transactions to any 
significant extent.  
Current efforts (OECD 2013a) to establish a more leak-
proof international tax regime may end unhappily 
unless both the political foundations of the regime are 
strengthened and the critical issue of administrability 
is resolved. Even the best-designed international tax 
regime will not work if it cannot be reliably collected -- 
for instance, because some key parameters are porous or 
indefinite, or because it is simply too complex to expect 
adequate compliance even from diligent and honest self-
enforcers or adequate enforcement from even the best 
tax officials.  Such problems are unlikely to be resolved 
quickly or easily by the widespread adoption of a radical 
policy change like the unitary approach.  Instead, the 
path to workable solutions is more likely to lie in the kind 
of continuing evolutionary and accretionary process of 
change – ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Mahoney 2012) –
that marks the past history of international taxation.
One way or another, no relatively open economy can 
now think of what tax regime is best for it in isolation 
from the taxes that exist in other countries. The current 
international tax and trade regime is the result of decades 
of effort to reduce both the distortionary effects of 
multiple trade taxes and the use of taxes to shape, color 
and subsidize trade and, to some extent, investment. 
The questions debated by League of Nations experts in 
the 1920s, like the language of that debate, are eerily 
similar to present debates at various international and 
cross-national levels about how to grapple with the even 
more difficult (and considerably broader) problems that 
arise from the increasingly large share of income coming 
from such ‘footloose’ factors as intangibles and financial 
structuring. Tax systems have always competed with each 
other for shares of a shared tax base.  Historically, when 
countries’ interests collide, solutions have been reached 
either through conflict or, in one form or another, 
through cooperation. Few issues are more important 
in determining tax policy today than deciding how to 
cope with the international environment.  The extent to 
which and the manner in which the issues currently at 
the forefront of international tax discussions are resolved 
will have important implications – for better or for worse 
-- for the future prospects of global taxation and, indeed, 
for the critical question of global governance in general 
(Eccleston 2012).
79For a useful recent discussion of inter-nation equity, see Brooks (2009).
34 
It is not hard to think of potentially large global tax bases 
on which even a low tax rate might potentially yield a 
lot of money. But this does not mean that such taxes 
are necessarily acceptable, feasible, or desirable at the 
global level.   Until nation-states in the interest of their 
own survival and (one hopes) the continued well-being of 
their citizens are willing to forgo substantial sovereignty 
in favor of an effective world governance structure, 
matters are unlikely to change much.  It may be fun to 
think of global tax proposals; it may be possible to make 
impressive calculations of their revenue potential; it may 
even, as mentioned earlier, be a good idea to discuss and 
explore such proposals because important global public 
goods like stability and even survival may in the end only 
be achievable as and when countries begin to act as well 
as think globally.  Those who put forth such proposals 
have usually done so with the best intentions and for 
reasons that are worth taking seriously.  However, not 
only is the way forward unlikely to be quick or simple but 
the path to progress is much more likely to be through the 
further evolution of the sort of ‘soft’ international context 
in which international tax matters are now discussed 
than by creating any kind of effective supranational tax 
authority. 
When solutions to problems are hard to find, sometimes 
the best way to react may be to approach them differently. 
Taxes, like the world itself, are never perfect and always 
in need of constant revision and interpretation.  Even the 
most technically perfect legal designs or technological 
solutions (e.g. to increase tax transparency or to foster 
international tax cooperation) cannot and will not 
ever achieve perfection let along stasis in a changing 
environment. The best and most sustainable approach 
to both international and global tax problems lies less 
in cleverly innovative tax design than in developing and 
improving the process through which such problems are 
(and will almost certainly continue to be) defined and 
resolved. 
One essential condition for a sustainable solution is 
greater inclusivity:  more of those affected in a significant 
way by decisions must be heard -- and know that they 
are heard -- in reaching those decisions.  Even the best, 
most prolonged and thorough consultation process may 
never reconcile some to accepting decisions to which 
they object.  But when such decisions are reached as 
part of an on-going reciprocal process, with some losing 
on this and others on that front, they are more likely to 
be acceptable even to those who lose than are decisions 
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that losers can rationalize as having been imposed from 
above or outside.  
A major failing of the current international tax system 
has been the (generally correct) extent to which it 
has been seen to reflect primarily the interests of the 
major developed countries.  Many of the proposals for 
global taxation discussed earlier have suffered from the 
reverse problem:  too often they appear to represent 
only the interests of the poorer emerging countries to 
the detriment of the interests of those who are (or think 
they are) expected to bear most of the burden. Despite 
the limitations of the OECD-type soft law consensus 
approach to at least partial and acceptable solutions to 
complex international issues through a lengthy and on-
going process of technical work and policy discussions 
involving an increasingly large and more representative 
group of countries and interests, gradually extending 
this process and making it more inclusive remains the 
most promising way available to develop common goals, 
definitions, concepts, assessments and evaluations of 
the very broad ranges of activities and interests affected 
by tax decisions. 
Global issues of justice and fairness need not be dealt with 
globally and cannot be dealt with solely by nation-states: 
what is needed is some forum between these extremes in 
which such issues can be discussed and, perhaps, resolved 
(Sen 1999). Because the traditional closed economy 
analytical box no longer adequately encompasses the 
critical marginal (international) component of tax policy, 
national policy choices increasingly have to be framed 
outside that box.   Relatively open developed countries 
have already begun in effect to delegate more and more 
elements of national tax authority to such informal 
arenas as associations of tax administrators and policy 
makers concerned with international tax issues.  
However, those charged with shaping and implementing 
national tax policy must also continue to work towards 
more transparent and balanced processes in shaping the 
international tax policy decisions that impact on and to 
some extent limit national tax policy autonomy.  The on-
going policy discussions reflected in OECD (2013, 2013a) 
seem unlikely to produce results that are in any sense 
definitive or likely to be acceptable to all, or for that matter 
to be quickly implemented.  Indeed, if pushed too far and 
too fast, the outcome of the current process may prove 
to be as unsuccessful as was the earlier attempt to attack 
‘harmful tax competition.’80 Even if the process eventually 
80Eccleston (2012) discusses this earlier experience in detail.
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led to the establishment of some kind of nascent ‘world’ 
tax organization, it is inconceivable that it would have 
even the small degree of independent taxing power of the 
European Union.81 Moreover, although strong leadership 
by strong states like the US will remain an essential 
element in resolving international (let alone global) tax 
issues it may no longer be enough.  An increasing number 
of other countries must also sign on if such initiatives are 
to succeed.  Indeed, if one extrapolates the experience 
of the EU to the world at large one possible inference is 
that traditional leaders in international tax matters like 
the US may over time perhaps become a bit less likely 
(and able) to take actions on their own to avoid or reduce 
their own perceived problems, especially when such 
actions may arguably pre-empt more broadly acceptable 
(less US-focused) solutions that may perhaps, over time 
have emerged from the kind of increasingly formal joint 
policy actions and administrative cooperation between 
national administrations that is already taking place.82
81A recent study suggests that “…the concept of a fiscal union will only work if political integration goes significantly beyond the current state of affairs, and 
probably far beyond levels that would be supported by European citizens and voters” (Fuest and Peichl 2012, 9).  If this can be said about the European Union after 
a half-century of economic union, the prospects for meaningful fiscal union at the world level seem bleak indeed.
82See, for example, the contrasting views in the sources cited in note 78 above.
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Three major issues arise with respect to global taxes: 
Are there circumstances in which such taxes are not only 
desirable but necessary? Is an explicitly redistributive 
global tax system a reasonable goal?  Are there instances 
in which ‘global’ taxes may be not only sensible but 
feasible?  The answer to the first of these questions at 
present appears on the whole to be negative. The day may 
come when climate-induced starvation and migration, 
mass deaths from pollution, the world-wide collapse of 
the financial system, or some other catastrophe such as 
widespread nuclear disaster may change this answer. 
Fortunately, that day is not yet here.  The answer to the 
second question is much the same: its day has not yet 
come. Those who seek an automatic (and expanding) way 
to finance aid to developing countries are no more likely 
to find general acceptance of explicitly redistributive 
global taxation now than they were half a century ago 
when attention began to be paid to this question.
The most critical of the three questions is the last, which 
is both more subtle and more important. Here, although 
the answer is less clear, it may well be that there are 
indeed instances in which a harmonized global tax 
approach may be both sensible and feasible – perhaps 
in particular with respect to controlling carbon emissions 
and, less clearly, perhaps also with respect to reducing 
international financial instability.  However, since even 
economically sensible and technically feasible solutions 
to real global problems need widespread political 
support, the world seems still to be some distance 
away from having established the conditions needed for 
success even in these limited areas.  
International finance, like international trade, is a matter 
of global concern.  Everyone, though to varying degrees, 
is affected over time by how well the system works. 
Governments that care about the well-being of their 
citizens have an interest in ensuring that market decisions 
take externalities into account to a greater extent than 
has been evident in recent years.  Decades of effort 
have gone into building the existing complex system of 
regulating both trade and finance – the one that many 
now think has not done a very good job.  Decades more 
may be needed to figure out how best to improve that 
system and to implement such improvements. One 
component of the answer may in the end be at least some 
limited form of global taxation or, more likely, relatively 
coordinated uniform national taxation.  Absent further 
crisis-driven stimulus, however, it seems unlikely that any 
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real global FTT will emerge in the near future. Instead, 
what seems more probably is further evolution of the role 
of institutions like the IMF and other international ‘soft 
regulatory’ bodies combined with even closer attention 
to coordinating national financial regulatory systems 
(such as the Basle capital requirement rules).83 Countries 
may of course continue to impose various forms of FTT 
for their own reasons but such taxes are unlikely to have 
very dramatic effects and are in any case not global in any 
meaningful sense.               
More critically, more almost certainly needs to be done 
to deal with climate change that according to most 
evidence appears to arise in part at least from the ways 
in which we use the earth’s resources.  Unfortunately, 
apart from the not very successful Kyoto starting 
point, surprisingly little has yet been done to develop 
institutions responsible for, let alone capable of, dealing 
with this complex set of problems.  To the extent actions 
have been taken they have generally followed the path 
of regulation rather than taxation, and this is likely to 
continue to be the case in the future (Baumert 1998). 
From a fiscal perspective, however, the most obvious 
way to proceed is, first, to reduce the surprising extent 
to which even very poor countries continue to squander 
scarce budgetary resources on clearly inefficient and 
almost always inequitable subsidies to fossil fuel 
consumption (McLure 2013), and, second, to focus on 
developing more coordinated national levies on carbon 
emissions, perhaps supported by soft law frameworks 
like those that now underlie the international tax system 
– frameworks that are essentially voluntarily enforced 
by countries acting in their own interests (Eccleston 
2012).  As and when countries decide to reduce carbon 
emissions, the economically preferable way to do so is to 
increase the rate of effective taxation on activities that 
generate negative externalities so that people face the 
real social costs of their choices, whether about where to 
invest or what to consume. 
On the other hand, although almost everyone likes to 
tax the very rich (except, one assumes, the very rich 
themselves) almost no one wants to see outsiders taxing 
their rich so there is little political support – or indeed 
economic rationale -- for such ideas as global wealth taxes. 
Nonetheless, a few limited ideas for more coordinated 
(global) taxes may have some merit, for example, with 
respect to the taxation on international transportation 
of goods and people and perhaps even (at the regional 
83For the most recent such rules, see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
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level) excise taxation on such ‘sin’ goods as tobacco and 
alcohol.  These two cases are very different, however. 
Any significant tax increases on shipping and aviation 
would require a considerable degree of international 
agreement to be effective, even if the revenue accrues 
strictly to the taxing nations, but to the extent such taxes 
have the same externality rationale as carbon taxes they 
make economic sense (Keen, Parry and Strand 2013).  On 
the other hand, while it may be a good idea on economic 
grounds to increase taxes on so-called ‘sin’ goods and on 
administrative grounds to coordinate such increases at 
least with neighboring countries, there is no plausible 
argument for any but national taxes on such goods. Pleas 
to impose special global taxes on such goods, with the 
proceeds to be channelled to international agencies and 
earmarked for specific worthy causes, have no economic 
rationale and seem likely to have as little political traction 
in the future as they have had in the past.
Most of the controversy about global taxation revolves 
around three central issues: the economics of the idea, 
whether it can be implemented effectively or not, and its 
distributional effects. The economic arguments for taxes 
(or equivalent regulations) to induce market decision-
makers to make more efficient decisions with respect 
to carbon emissions or (considerably less certainly) 
financial structures are generally sound.  The extent to 
which such ideas can be implemented effectively through 
coordinated national activities or soft international 
arrangements has been less explored but at least in 
these two cases it may perhaps be possible over time 
-- with enough effort and no doubt after many failed 
negotiations -- to reach a ‘soft’ solution through largely 
voluntary cooperation and coordination that would be 
an improvement on the existing situation.  Since in a 
sense everybody at some level and in some degree has 
something to gain from resolving these problems, the 
world as a whole, fragmented and contentious as it is, 
may perhaps at some stage and in some manner be able 
to work out some way of accomplishing these goals that 
will be broadly acceptable at least to the main players -- 
that is, those whose cooperation is essential to reaching 
the intended goal. Or at least that is what one must hope 
since this appears to be about all one can expect from 
the world we live in short of some cataclysmic crisis. 
However, no matter how desirable one may think it 
to be for the rich to be taxed to help the poor, major 
redistributive proposals for global taxation are unlikely to 
be accepted.  One may wish that such schemes existed 
for ethical reasons as well as for such consequential 
reasons as (perhaps) improved world stability.  But one 
cannot realistically expect them to be accepted unless 
and until at least most people in most major countries 
truly accept that they are part of a larger world polity.  If 
and when that time ever comes, prescribing a sensible 
world tax system will not pose any insuperable economic 
or technical issues.  Until then, however, we will have 
to continue to struggle along with the patched-up and 
partial international system we now have, modified from 
time to time as new players and new interests enter 
the decision-making group and as that group faces new 
realities. If and when that system reaches a sustainable 
and inclusive agreement about how to treat cross-
border transactions, the possible basis for a more global 
approach to financing global public goods may at last 
exist.  Until then, however, those who would make the 
world a better place seem best advised to focus more 
on improving the information and evidence needed for 
better domestic policy decisions in light of a realistic 
appraisal of world realities. The alternative approach of 
proposing radical reforms – mirages - that are not going 
to be accepted runs the risk of making it too easy to 
neglect the hard and necessary work of working out how 
the world as a whole can possibly cope with some of the 
real,  complex, contested and changing problems raised 
in the global tax literature.
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